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ARTICLES
THE SEC AND ACCOUNTING,
IN PART THROUGH THE EYES OF PACIOLI
Matthewj Barrett*
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental accounting equation unequivocally states:
Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Equity.
Without periodic reports from business enterprises describing in
some detail exactly how the specific assets, liabilities, and components
of owners' equity underlying this equation have changed, investors
cannot gauge a firm's financial performance and regulators remain
powerless to prevent public companies from misleading investors and
the general public about their financial health. As a result, following
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the federal securities laws have required disclo-
sure reports both from enterprises that seek to become public
companies by offering their securities to the public and also from
businesses that already had successfully done so. Until the late 1960s,
these reports relied exclusively on financial statements and accompa-
nying notes to provide financial disclosures. Because numbers almost
never tell the full story, the financial statements and notes usually sup-
plied only a sketch, rather than a full-color picture, of a public com-
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pany's financial condition and operating results. By mandating a
textual discussion to accompany and analyze those numbers, the Man-
agement's Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) requirements rank as per-
haps the most significant administrative initiative involving the
intersection between accounting and disclosure in the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) seventy-year history.'
In 1980, the SEC adopted integrated disclosure requirements2
found in Regulation S-K3 that apply to both so-called "issuers" that
1 The MD&A requirements trace their roots back to at least 1968. See Guides for
Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Securities Act Release No. 4936, 33
Fed. Reg. 18,617, 18,620 (Dec. 17, 1968). While neither published as Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules nor as bearing the Commission's official approval,
the guides set forth the policies and practices that the Division of Corporation Fi-
nance followed in administering the registration requirements. In 1974, the SEC au-
thorized amendments to both Guide 22, which at the time was entitled "Summary of
Earnings" for registration statements under the Securities Act, and Guide 1, "Sum-
mary of Operations," for filings under the Securities Exchange Act. See Guidelines for
Registration and Reporting, Accounting Series Release No. 159, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,894,
31,894-95 (Sept. 3, 1974) (reiterating that the guides do not bear the SEC's official
approval); see also Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act
Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,716 (Apr. 24, 1987) (discussing the his-
tory of MD&A requirements).
2 See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations,
and Guides; Integration of Securities Act Disclosure Systems, Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 279, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980). The rules apply to both filings
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77a-77aa (West 1997 & Supp. 2004)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
72-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm (West 1997 &
Supp. 2004)). As background, the federal securities laws require any enterprise pro-
posing to offer securities to the public, often referred to as "issuers," to disclose cer-
tain information and to file financial statements with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)
(2000). In addition, so-called "registrants," which include those companies whose
shares or debt obligations are listed on a national securities exchange, such as the
New York Stock Exchange or the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., or which meet certain
tests relating to total assets and number of shareholders, must file periodic reports
and financial statements with the SEC to provide information to the investing public.
Id. § 78m(a). Under existing rules, enterprises with ten million dollars or more in
assets and 500 or more owners of any class of equity securities must file periodic re-
ports with the SEC, even if their securities are not traded on a national securities
exchange. Id. § 7 8 1(g) (1), (h); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2004). Together, these initial
and continuing disclosure obligations seek to prevent misleading or incomplete fi-
nancial reporting and to enable investors to reach informed decisions.
3 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915. Regulation S-K applies to both enterprises desiring
to offer securities to the public and to registrants that must file periodic reports with
the SEC. See id. § 229.10(a). Item 5 of Form 20-F under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 requires similar disclosures from foreign private issuers that either seek to
[VOL. 8o:3
THROUGH THE EYES OF PACIOLI
seek to become public companies and "registrants" that already hold
that distinction. These rules continue to provide standard instruc-
tions for most enterprises filing forms under the federal securities
laws. In particular, Item 303 of Regulation S-K, entitled "Manage-
ment's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of
Operations," requires an issuer or registrant to discuss its liquidity,
capital resources, operating results, and other information necessary
to understand the financial statements. 4 Recognizing that the tradi-
tional dry recitation of numbers and the accompanying often boiler-
plate notes to financial statements rarely allowed an investor "to judge
the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past performance is in-
dicative of future performance,"5 the MD&A seeks to give the reader
an opportunity to view the enterprise "through the eyes of
management."6
By insisting on more comprehensive and comprehensible disclo-
sures regarding corporate accounting, the SEC-almost certainly un-
wittingly-reached across the centuries and the globe to validate
further the work of an Italian Renaissance friar by the name of Luca
Pacioli. 7 Anointed by accounting historians as the "Father of Account-
ing,"8 Pacioli wrote the first known treatise that describes the process
the business community today calls double-entry bookkeeping. 9
register securities or to file annual or transition reports under the Securities Ex-
change Act. See id. § 249.220f. Regulation S-B contains similar requirements for
"small business issuers," see id. § 228.10(a) (1), essentially domestic or Canadian com-
panies whose revenues and "public float," which generally means the aggregate mar-
ket value of outstanding securities, fall below twenty-five million dollars. Id.
§§ 228.10-703.
4 Id. § 229.303.
5 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Financial Reporting Release
No. 36, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm.
6 Id.
7 Translators have used various spellings for this individual's first and last names.
See, e.g., Raymond de Roover, Paciolo or Pacioli?, 19 Accr. Rv. 68 (1944) (arguing
additionally that because modem Italian commonly drops the "u," the forms
"Paciuoli" and "Paciuolo" have become obsolete).
8 See Richard H. Macve, Pacioli's Legacy, in AccouNrINc HISTORY FROM THE REN-
AISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 3 (T.A. Lee et al. eds., 1996).
9 See id. at 4. Double-entry bookkeeping flows from the fundamental accounting
equation, which you may recall provides:
Assets = Liabilities + Owners' Equity.
Collectively, liabilities and owner's equity serve as the "sources" that allow an en-
terprise to finance its assets. Under double-entry bookkeeping, changes in either the
mix of assets or their sources do not affect the equality of the fundamental accounting
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When Pacioli published his text in 1494,10 or 440 years before Con-
gress created the SEC, double-entry bookkeeping had been used for
equation. To illustrate, an increase in an asset may come about in one of two ways:
either another asset has been exchanged for it, or an additional source of funds has
been supplied to acquire it. On the balance sheet, the increase in the asset column
would either be offset by a decrease in the asset column or be balanced by an increase
in the sources column. Likewise, a decrease in an asset may come about in one of two
ways. If assets have been exchanged, we have the transaction already discussed, but
stated in reverse order-the decrease in assets will be accompanied by an increase in
assets reflecting the acquisition of the new asset. The other possibility is a decrease in
the sources column, reflecting perhaps the use of an asset to pay a liability. Finally,
there can be an exchange of sources, which would be reflected by equal increases and
decreases in the sources column. Accountants use debits to reflect increases in assets
or decreases in sources. By comparison, credits reduce assets or increase sources.
Under the fundamental accounting equation and double-entry bookkeeping, the to-
tal debits must always equal the total credits.
In contrast, a checkbook register illustrates single-entry bookkeeping. A check-
book register allows us to keep track of a single asset, namely our checking account.
Properly maintained, our checkbook tells us the balance in our checking account,
when we deposited funds, and where we spent cash. The checkbook register, how-
ever, does not tell us what other assets we own or what liabilities we owe. For exam-
ple, the checkbook register does not tell us whether we still own the clothes we wrote
a check to purchase two years ago, that we own a car we recently purchased on credit,
or what we still owe on the car. Double-entry bookkeeping permits more comprehen-
sive financial reports. See generally DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEWJ. BARRETT, MATERI-
ALS ON AcCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 14-20 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining the distinction
between single- and double-entry bookkeeping in greater detail).
10 Pacioli's description appears within a much longer text on arithmetic and ge-
ometry entitled Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportioinalita. SeeJOHN
B. GEIJSBEEK, ANCIENT DOUBLE-ENTRY BOOKKEEPING 8 (Scholars Book Co. 1974)
(1914); Macve, supra note 8, at 30. Pacioli discusses bookkeeping in part 1, section 9,
treatise 11, under the translated title Particulars of Reckonings and Their Recording. GEIJ-
SBEEK, supra, at 8. Modern historians currently believe that Pacioli began his treatise
at age nineteen and then labored some thirty years before publishing his treatise at
age forty-nine. See Michael J. Fischer, Luca Pacioli on Business Profits, 25 J. Bus. ETHICS
299, 301 (2000). Pacioli likely died in 1517, at seventy-two years of age. Macve, supra
note 8, at 25 n.1. Earlier scholars placed his death in 1509. SeeGEIJSBEEK, supra, at 8.
Over the years, scholars have translated Pacioli's Italian text into German, Dutch,
Russian, English, and other languages. See id. at 3-4. The first "modern" English
translation appeared in 1914, twenty years before the SEC's creation. See id. at 1.
Only five modem English translations of the Summa generate much attention, begin-
ning with the first modem English translation byJohn B. Geijsbeek in 1914. Other
modem English translations include Crivelli (1924); Brown and Johnston (1963);
Cripps (1994); and Gebsattel and Yamey (1994). See PIETRO CRIVELLI, AN ORIGINAL
TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE ON DOUBLE-ENTRY BOOK-KEEPING BY FRATER LUCAS PAci-
OLI (Nihon Shoseki, Ltd. 1974) (1924); R. GENE BROWN & KENNETH S. JOHNSTON,
PACIOLO ON ACCOUNTING (1963);JEREMY CRIPPS, PARTICULARIS DE COMPUTIS ET SCRIP-
TuRis (1994); ANTONIA VON GEBSATTEL & BASIL YAMEY, EXPOSITION OF DOUBLE ENTRY
BOOKKEEPING (1994). These later translations typically cite Geijsbeek's translation as
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more than two hundred years in Venice, then the world's commercial
center.'' So while he did not invent the process, accounting histori-
ans credit Pacioli for providing the first systematic written study of
accounting. Pacioli's efforts, however, extend beyond mere descrip-
tion. The friar also set forth and endorsed basic principles that would
ultimately develop into the field of financial accounting. Some of
these principles, I argue, still resonate today. Taking a cue from the
MD&A requirements and the SEC's efforts to give investors an oppor-
tunity to view a public company "through the eyes of management,"
this Article seeks to pull together two threads, namely Pacioli's promi-
nence in accounting and the importance of the MD&A requirements,
to evaluate the SEC's record on certain accounting issues.
Because writers in legal journals have largely ignored Pacioli's ef-
forts, 1 2 Part I of this Article highlights and outlines some of the friar's
contributions and accounting precepts. Part II applies some of these
precepts in a critique of the SEC's record on accounting issues. Using
this discussion as a springboard, Part III then offers additional reflec-
tions of the SEC's reliance, sometimes via congressional direction or
acquiescence, on private-sector bodies to establish accounting princi-
ples and standards governing audits of public companies; the SEC's
leadership regarding the MD&A requirements, most notably through
an administrative action against Caterpillar, Inc.; and auditor inde-
pendence. After identifying particular accomplishments in most of
these areas notwithstanding often inadequate resources, Part IV con-
cludes that the failure to safeguard auditor independence stands as
the SEC's one glaring weakness during its first seventy years. Looking
ahead, therefore, an enhanced focus on this particular problem seems
necessary to ensure investor confidence and to help keep the U.S. se-
curities markets as the world's leaders.
I. PACIOLI's LEGACY TO LiFE, BUSINESS, AND ACCOUNTING
A Franciscan friar and an experienced and renowned teacher,
Pacioli spoke articulately, and with great insight, to the faithful, to
merchants, and to his students.
a reference. See CRIVELLI, supra, at vii; BROWN & JOHNSTON, supra, at 143; CRIPPs,
supra, at bibliography; GEBSA-rEL & YAMEv, supra, at 163 n.4.
11 Pacioli Revisited, J. Acer., May 1987, at 196, 197.
12 Searching Westlaw's full-text database of "Journals & Law Reviews Combined"
(JLR) in November 2004 produced only nine articles, and a Lexis-Nexis search of full-
text "US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined" revealed only eleven articles mention-
ing Pacioli's name.
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Pacioli used the printing press and Italian vernacular to docu-
ment techniques that allow business owners to assess periodically an
enterprise's profitability, while offering certain inbuilt checks that
help to guard against errors and omissions. He recognized the need
for honesty in business dealings, saw cash and liquidity as essential to
an enterprise's survival and success, and advocated current value ac-
counting. In addition, Pacioli urged his readers to integrate their pro-
fessional lives and religious beliefs.
My favorite Pacioli lessons about life, business, and accounting
include:
* "[A] bove all, remember God and your neighbor; never forget to
attend to religious meditation every morning, for through this
you will never lose your way . . .,,3
* "If you are in business and do not know all about it, your money
will go like flies-That is, you will lose it."'14
* "[I] t is always good to close the books each year, especially if you
are in partnership with others .... Frequent accounting makes
for long friendship."1 5
* "More bridges are necessary to make a good merchant than a
lawyer can make." 16
* "The law helps those that are awake, not those that sleep."17
Pacioli also offers some consolation to my students, who often get
frustrated by my "learn-by-doing" approach:
* "Who does nothing, makes no mistakes; who makes no mistakes
learns nothing ....,18
Because this symposium addresses the federal securities laws, in
the interest of full disclosure, I should also reveal that Pacioli report-
edly gave the following advice about teaching:
* "You have to learn to tell a thousand holy lies." 9
13 GEIJSBEEK, supra note 10, at 37. Interestingly, another translation uses the word
"Mass" rather than "meditation." CRIVELLI, supra note 10, at 12 ("[B]ut, above all first
always keep God before your eyes and never miss hearing Mass in the morning, bear-
ing in mind that because of it time is never lost, as by charity riches are not
wasted . . ").
14 GEIJSBEEK, supra note 10, at 63 (introjecting a proverb).
15 Id. at 67.
16 Id. at 37 (referring to a proverb); see also id. at 77 ("The proverb says that we
need more bridges to make a merchant than a doctor of laws can make.").
17 Id. at 37. When I share this epigram with my students I add "especially those
law students who stay awake during class."
18 Id. at 53 (relating a "common proverb").
19 R. Emmett Taylor, Pacioli, 10 Accr. REv. 168, 173 (1935).
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I'm not quite sure what can be holy about lies.
Before turning from these epigrams to Pacioli's more systematic
statements about accounting, first realize that this Franciscan friar
showed extraordinary practical vision. Although, like other contem-
poraries, Pacioli sought in his treatise to apply mathematics to work-
day problems, 20 he went further and used state-of-the-art technology,
namely the printing press, to disseminate his work. Equally signifi-
cant, Pacioli selected the most user-friendly and accessible language,
the Italian vernacular, over Latin, and chose Arabic numbers rather
than Roman numerals. 21 These choices assured that his work could
potentially reach the widest possible audience in the business
community.
Turning to the content in Pacioli's treatise, keep in mind that
during the fifteenth century business owners rarely, if ever, even at-
tempted to determine if their businesses were operating profitably
over a specific period, such as a year. 22 Pacioli's text corrected this
deficiency and documented a method for periodically and objectively
calculating an enterprise's profits. 23 For this contribution, commenta-
tors have deemed Pacioli's ideas central to the concept of profitability,
indeed to the very definition of modern capitalism. 24 Quite ironically,
then, this member of the Order of Friars Minor of St. Francis,25 a
professed religious man bound by a vow of poverty, drastically influ-
enced the development of accounting.26
Further illustrating Pacioli's practical relevance, he advocated
current value accounting rather than the historical costs generally
used in financial accounting today.27 When recording assets, Pacioli
recommended using amounts "according to current prices." 28 Ac-
cordingly, he advised: "Make the prices rather higher than lower; for
instance, if it seems to you that they are worth 20, you put down 24, so
20 Macve, supra note 8, at 10.
21 Id. Pacioli used Roman numerals only for dates in the accounting books. Id. at
12.
22 Pacioli Revisited, supra note 11, at 197.
23 See Fischer, supra note 10, at 299.
24 For a contrary opinion, see Macve, supra note 8, at 7, discussing another com-
mentator's observation that the calculation of profit and loss arose more as a by-
product of the accounting requirement to balance the ledger than a prime objective
and output of the system.
25 See GEIJSBEEK, supra note 10, at 8.
26 In 1508, Pope Julius II granted Pacioli a bull, which gave him authority to own
property and exempted him from the Franciscan rule that, among other things, re-
quired its members to live "without property." Macve, supra note 8, at 10.
27 See Pacioli Revisited, supra note 11, at 197.
28 GEIJSBEEK, supra note 10, at 45.
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that you can make a larger profit."29 Pacioli's current value account-
ing, or more accurately, "target pricing," seeks then a more vivid por-
trayal of an enterprise's financial situation.30 The historical cost
approach rejects this methodology, however, because it sacrifices relia-
bility. To illustrate this point, take the example of the Walt Disney
Company, which in the 1930s acquired the raw land on which Disney-
land now sits. Under the historical cost method generally used in fi-
nancial accounting today, that land remains on Disney's books at its
actual cost, even though the land has appreciated tremendously in
value. 31 While accountants could seek to estimate the land's current
fair market value, a wide range of estimated current values would
likely emerge, which would reduce the reliability of the company's fi-
nancial statements.
Reliability, however, remained quite important to Pacioli. He ob-
served that, throughout Italy, "nothing was considered superior to the
word of the good merchant, and oaths were taken on the word of a
good merchant."32 His treatise, above all, sought to further that end.
Recognizing that double-entry bookkeeping offers "inbuilt
checks" that both can prevent errors or omissions and identify them
when they occur, 33 Pacioli advised the good bookkeeper to ensure
that the total debits equal the total credits, in essence describing what
we refer to today as the "trial balance."34 In addition to fostering accu-
racy, the bookkeeping process allowed a separation of duties between
several clerks who could accomplish their assigned tasks, such as re-
cording transactions or posting amounts to the accounts in the
ledger.3 5 Pacioli also recommended several controls that businesses
could use to preclude fraud.3 6 For example, he wrote that merchants
could number the pages in the memorandum book, journal, and
ledger to prevent someone from tearing out one of the pages. 37
"[O]n account of the bad faith of the present time," the good friar
further advised bankers to require a receipt for all transactions. 38 Of
course, not all of Pacioli's ideas survived the long trip to the twenty-
29 Id. at 45, 51; see Macve, supra note 8, at 7.
30 See Macve, supra note 8, at 7.
31 See Terry Lloyd, Financial Language in Legal Documents, in HERWITZ & BARRETr,
supra note 9, at 420, 426.
32 GEUSBEEK, supra note 10, at 33.
33 Again, for a contrary view, see Macve, supra note 8, at 7.
34 See GEUSBEEK, supra note 10, at 73; see also HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 9, at
43-44 (describing the trial balance).
35 See Macve, supra note 8, at 21.
36 See GEUSBEEK, supra note 10, at 39; see also Pacioli Revisited, supra note 11, at 197.
37 See GEUSBEEK, supra note 10, at 39, 41, 73.
38 Id. at 65.
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first century. For example, he urged a form of "internal auditing"
when a merchant closes the books at the end of an accounting period
to determine the profit for the period. In that regard, he suggested
hiring "a helper" to read off all the journal items so that the merchant
can check each one in the ledger, a process unimaginable for today's
public companies. 39
Notwithstanding his own vow of poverty, Pacioli astutely recog-
nized that, among the things required to carry on a business, "cash or
any equivalent" ranks as "[t] he most important."40 Even today, liquid-
ity, or an ability to pay debts as they come due, remains essential for a
business to survive. 41
Notwithstanding Pacioli's emphasis on the temporal, we should
not forget that, as a professed member of a religious community, Paci-
oli viewed himself as a man of God. Because we have gathered at the
University of Notre Dame, it seems especially appropriate to highlight
that Pacioli viewed the spiritual and secular as inextricably inter-
twined. He believed that people should integrate, rather than segre-
gate, their business and professional careers with their personal lives
and religious convictions. Thus, his treatise, which taught the mun-
dane details of bookkeeping, also instructed merchants to "begin
their business with the name of God at the beginning of every book
and have His holy name in their minds." 42 Pacioli also endorsed as
"good custom" the practice "among true Christians," which at that
time in Venice meant "Catholics," to mark their accounting books and
records with the Sign of the Cross. 43 Such marks routinely appeared
39 See id. at 69.
40 Id. at 33. Second, a successful businessman must be a good accountant and a
ready mathematician. Third, the businessman must arrange his affairs in a systemic
way so that he may get their particulars at a glance. Id.; see Pacioli Revisited, supra note
11, at 197.
41 GEIJSBEEK, supra note 10, at 33.
42 Id. at 33, 35. During the chapter on business records and letters, Pacioli
observes:
It is customary among merchants to write the year and the day and the place
at the top at the beginning of the letter. But first, like a good Christian, you
should always remember to write down the glorious name of our Savior-
that is, the name of Jesus, or in its place the sign of the Holy Cross, in whose
name our transactions must always be made ....
Id. at 75.
43 Pacioli writes:
Among true Christians there is the good custom to mark their first books
with that glorious sign from which every enemy of the spiritual flees and
before which all the infernal spirits justly tremble-that is, the holy cross, by
which in our tender years we begin to learn to read .... So that we call the
2005]
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at the top of the various pages of his journals and ledgers.4 4
Pacioli's contributions should provide sufficient background to
discuss the SEC's accounting and disclosure rules. In an effort to dis-






0 Oaths (representing honesty)
L Liquidity (or cash)
I Integrated life
II. PACIOLI'S POSSIBLE ANALYSIS OF THE SEC's RECORD
ON AccOuNTING ISSUES
If Pacioli could attend this symposium, I would venture to guess
he would offer both praise and criticism to the SEC for its record on
accounting issues during the past seventy years. When referring to the
SEC, let's assume that Pacioli would direct his comments to the Com-
mission, its staff, the Commissioners-and to Congress, which estab-
lishes the laws that govern the Agency's activities and, at least as
importantly, determines the funding for the Commission's
operations.
The SEC's record on accounting issues encompasses dual efforts:
its undertakings to establish both accounting principles and auditing
standards, and its endeavors to require disclosures about financial
matters. Based upon his treatise, Pacioli might evaluate the SEC's re-
cord on accounting principles and auditing standards, including its
efforts to require supplemental disclosures about current value and to
mandate internal controls and to require reports on the effectiveness
of those controls. In addition, he might comment on the SEC's ef-
forts to require officer certifications and the MD&A requirements,
which direct issuers and registrants to discuss their liquidity and capi-
tal resources.
During this discussion, we should keep in mind the context
within which the SEC operates. First, the term "accounting princi-
ples" refers to the "rules" governing the compilation of accounting
data into financial statements and the form and content of those state-
first books with the Cross, or Memorandum with Cross, and the second
Memorandum A, Journal A, Ledger A.
Id. at 39.
44 See, e.g., id. at 35, 43, 49, 55.
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ments. Accordingly, the term "generally accepted accounting princi-
ples," often abbreviated as GAAP, refers to those practices enjoying
substantial support at a particular time. Perhaps surprisingly, GAAP
commonly offers choices among permissible alternatives and often
does not provide specific rules for treating various transactions. Sub-
ject to certain oversight by both the audit committee and the indepen-
dent auditor, a public company's management selects the accounting
principles that the enterprise will use from among the acceptable al-
ternatives. In addition, management usually also decides in the first
instance how the public company will report an event when no spe-
cific rule exists. 45
Directors, investors, and creditors typically want assurances that
the financial statements management prepares contain reliable repre-
sentations about the enterprise's financial health. As a result, a certi-
fied public accountant or a public accounting firm serves as an
auditor to examine, on an independent basis, the financial statements
management has prepared. In an audit, the auditor seeks to gather
evidence about, and then assesses, the various representations in these
statements about the enterprise's assets and liabilities at a specific date
and transactions during a particular accounting period. Ultimately,
an auditor in this country wants to express an opinion as to whether
the financial statements that management prepares fairly present the
enterprise's financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows
in accordance with GAAP in the United States, which this Article will
refer to simply as GAAP, even though some lawyers and accountants
use the acronym GAAPUS. During the audit, the auditor must act in
certain ways and perform certain procedures, which accountants refer
to collectively as auditing standards, before expressing an opinion on
the financial statements. 46
A. Accessibility to the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Authorities and
Financial Disclosures Filed with the SEC
As you might surmise from the previous discussion, a complex
web of accounting and disclosure rules exists today. Perhaps not as
apparent, these rules require a veritable mountain of disclosure docu-
ments. If Pacioli were alive today, the SEC's award-winning website,
45 See generally DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEWJ. BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNT-
ING FOR LAWYERS 7 (3d ed. Supp. 2004) (discussing the difference between accounting
principles and auditing standards).
46 See generally id. at 8 (describing the audit process and the role of auditing
standards).
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the Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval System (EDGAR) ,4 7
would likely catch his eye. This important innovation provides the
investing public near-immediate access to the disclosure documents
and financial statements that public companies file with the Commis-
sion. If disclosure functions as the heart for monitoring the financial
health of public companies in the United States, then EDGAR sup-
plies the lifeblood of that system.
The SEC has also devoted considerable energies to spelling out
guidance on various accounting and disclosure issues. By regulation,
most notably Regulations S-X, S-K, and S-B, the SEC sets forth the
requirements for the financial statements that issuers and registrants
must file with the Agency.48 Fleshing out those regulations and the
overarching federal securities laws are various administrative releases
and other guidance from the both SEC and its staff, especially profes-
sionals in the Office of the Chief Accountant and the Division of Cor-
poration Finance, regarding various accounting and financial
reporting issues.
From 1937 to 1982, the SEC published more than three hundred
Accounting Series Releases (ASRs) to inform the public about matters
relating to accounting and auditing. These releases expressed opin-
ions of the Commission and its Chief Accountant, who probably con-
tinues to qualify as the most influential accountant in the world,
regarding various accounting and financial reporting issues.49 In
1982, the SEC published the Codification of Financial Reporting Poli-
cies (the "Codification") to organize by topic the Commission's pub-
lished positions in the ASRs related to financial reporting.50 At that
47 2003 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ANN. REP. 11, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/
annrep03/ar03full.pdf.
48 Regulation S-X contains lengthy and detailed requirements prescribing the
specific items which issuers and registrants that do not qualify as "small business issu-
ers" must disclose or address in financial statements which they file with the Agency.
See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2004). In addition, Regulation S-K presents standard instructions
for filing forms under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, including directions related to certain financial information which those forms
require. See id. § 229. Regulation S-B, which applies to "small business issuers," see
supra note 3, exempts some registrants from certain requirements in Regulations S-X
and S-K. See 17 C.F.R. § 228.
49 As one of fourteen offices in the SEC, the Office of the Chief Accountant helps
to develop, subject to Commission approval, policy and rules on accounting and au-
diting issues relating to the federal securities laws. Responsibility for recommending
administrative proceedings relating to such matters and for assisting in such proceed-
ings also rests with the Office of the Chief Accountant, which the Chief Accountant
oversees. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 20-21.
50 Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Financial Reporting Release No.
1, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,028 (May 17, 1982).
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time, the Commission also announced it would issue Financial Report-
ing Releases (FRRs) to update the Codification in the future and des-
ignated the original codification as FRR No. 1.51 As a result, the
Codification and the FRRs supplement, but do not supplant, the rules
set forth in Regulations S-X, S-K, and S-B by providing background
and rationale for certain regulatory requirements. Today, the SEC
publishes FRRs when the Commission determines that the private sec-
tor has failed to deal with a particular type of item or problem area.
As of December 31, 2003, the SEC had issued seventy-two FRRs.
These releases and their predecessors, the ASRs, have frequently influ-
enced accounting developments5 2 while others have addressed various
administrative or enforcement matters involving registrants, account-
ants, and accounting firms. 53
Since 1975, the SEC has also published informal guidance con-
cerning accounting matters. 54 On August 1, 2004, the SEC an-
51 Id. at 21,029.
52 HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 45, at 20.
53 At the time the SEC announced the Codification and the FRRs, see supra note
50 and accompanying text, the Commission also published the first in a series of Ac-
counting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), which address administrative
or enforcement matters only. The Commission, however, did not codify about one
hundred ASRs involving administrative or enforcement matters. Instead, the Com-
mission included a topical index to AAER No. 1 for easier reference. As of Decem-
ber 31, 2003, the SEC had published 1936 AAERs, including 240 during 2003.
HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 45, at 21.
54 In ASR No. 180, the SEC announced a series of Staff Accounting Bulletins
(SABs) to present interpretations and practices which the Chief Accountant and the
Division of Corporation Finance follow in administering the disclosure requirements
in the federal securities laws. The Division of Corporation Finance, probably the most
influential of the SEC's four divisions on accounting issues, strives to ensure that the
financial information which registrants present to the public complies with the SEC's
rules and regulations. Notice of the Institution of a Series of Staff Accounting Bulle-
tins, Accounting Series Release No. 180, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 72,202, at 62,486 (Nov. 4, 1975). The SABs, however, do not constitute
rules or interpretations of the Commission, and they do not carry the Commission's
official approval. Nevertheless, the bulletins seek "to achieve a wider dissemination of
the administrative interpretations and practices utilized by the Commission's staff in
reviewing financial statements." Id. By 1981, the SEC's staff had issued thirty-nine
SABs. Early that year, the SEC released SAB No. 40, which codified the material in-
cluded in SAB Nos. 1 through 38 and superseded those releases, replacing them with
an updated and indexed integrated package. Codification of SAB Nos. 1-38, Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 40, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,513 (Feb. 9, 1981). Today, the SEC staff
incorporates all subsequently issued SABs into the codification by adding questions
and staff interpretations under topic headings. By 2003, the staff had issued sixty-two
additional SABs and occasional amendments. To update the existing codification
and to enhance the guidance's integrity and usefulness, the staff issued SAB No. 103.
Update of Codification of Staff Accounting Bulletins, Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
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nounced plans to begin posting comment letters to both issuers and
registrants regarding disclosure filings, including underlying account-
ing and disclosure issues, on its website. 55 The SEC and its staff have
also issued various regulations, administrative releases, and other gui-
dance on auditing issues, although to a much smaller extent than with
regard to accounting authorities. 56
103, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,840 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/
account/sab103.htm. As of December 31, 2003, the SEC's staff had issued 104 SABs.
HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 21-22.
In 1997, the Division of Corporation Finance began issuing Staff Legal Bulletins
(SLBs), which sometimes discuss accounting-related issues. Like SABs, these legal
bulletins represent the views of the Division's staff. Once again, however, the SEC has
neither approved nor disapproved the SLBs, and they are not rules or interpretations
of the Commission. As of December 31, 2003, the Division had issued fifteen SLBs
and revised several earlier SLBs. Id. at 22.
In an effort to provide additional guidance, the staff of the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance posts and periodically updates several other sources of information
about the statutes, rules, and regulations that the Division administers, some of which
involve accounting issues, on the SEC's website at http://www.sec.gov under the Infor-
mation for [Accountants] and Staff Interps links. These other sources include Division of
Corporation Finance: Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues (dated Aug. 31, 2001); Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance: International Financial Reporting and Disclosure Issues (dated
Oct. 1, 2003); and Division of Corporation Finance: Frequently Requested Accounting and
Financial Reporting Interpretations and Guidance (dated Mar. 31, 2001). These outlines
caution that they do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the SEC, the Com-
missioners, or other members of the staff. Finally, the Division also responds each
year to thousands of telephone inquiries, which often pose accounting issues. The
Division posts and periodically supplements a manual of staff telephone interpreta-
tions that seeks to provide "general guidance," but warns that users should not rely on
the responses as definitive. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 22.
55 Kenneth A. Gary, Circumventing FOIA: SEC to Post Letters on Web Site, 104 TAx
NoTEs 484 (2004). Section 408(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 408(a), 116 Stat. 745, 790-91, directs the SEC to review reports that public
companies file with the Commission at least once every three years. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 7266 (West Supp. 2004). As a result, we can expect both the number and signifi-
cance of the SEC's comment letters to increase in magnitude.
56 For example, Regulations S-X and S-B continue to address accountants' qualifi-
cations to serve as independent auditors. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01, 228.310 n.2 (2004).
Specifically, Regulation S-X and, for small business issuers, Regulation S-B, expressly
preclude an accountant from auditing a registrant's financial statements if the ac-
countant, the auditing firm, or a member of the firm owns a direct, or material indi-
rect, financial interest in the registrant or its parents, subsidiaries, or other affiliates,
or holds a close connection with the registrant as a director, officer, or employee. Id.
§ 210.2-01 (c) (1)-(2).
Similarly, FRRs sometimes involve auditing issues. See, e.g., Strengthening the
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Financial Reporting
Release No. 68, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (amending rules to enhance auditor
independence), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm. AAERs
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Having created this mass of rules and administrative materials,
the SEC now faces the task of bringing more order to the whole. Paci-
oli, the man who devoted thirty years of his life to systematizing
double-entry bookkeeping, would probably sympathize with the ef-
forts of the SEC and its staff to bring clarity to the accounting and
disclosure requirements-a daunting task by any standard. But our
practical friar did take extra pains to make his treatise accessible to
the ordinary businessman. Working solo and mired within the cul-
tural and technological limitations of the fifteenth century, Pacioli
nevertheless persevered in his task of reducing two centuries of book-
keeping practice to a concise and systematic compilation. Moreover,
he wrote his accounting treatise in a language all merchants could
understand. Finally, he used a printing press to ensure the widest dis-
tribution possible for his treatise. As a result, Pacioli might gently
chide the SEC to harness technology to synthesize and simplify the
steady stream of accounting rules and policies produced in recent
years. At the very least, he might suggest one online database to pro-
vide ready access to all the accounting rules applicable to issuers or
registrants, much as his treatise set forth the double-entry bookkeep-
ing process generally used in Venice during his lifetime.
B. Current Value Accounting
Thus far, then, the SEC and Pacioli essentially see things eye-to-
eye. Pacioli's use of current value or target pricing, however, would
give rise to their first serious disagreement. In fact, if Pacioli followed
his own advice and recorded a public company's assets, such as inven-
tory, "according to current prices,"57 and used higher prices rather
than lower ones so that the company could report a larger profit,58 he
might find himself in jail or barred from practicing before the SEC.
Under Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101,59 the lack of a market trans-
action would preclude revenue recognition. 60 In fact, Enron's "mark
to market accounting" and the company's premature revenue recog-
nition furthered that financial fraud. As only one example, Enron
sometimes involve disciplinary proceedings which the SEC has brought against audi-
tors for actions which the Commission considers substandard auditing practices.
57 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59 Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/ac-
count/sablOl.htm.
60 Id. at 68,936-37; see also Revision of Topic 13, Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
104, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,436 (Dec. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/
account/sabl04rev.pdf.
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reported a $111 million gain on the transfer to a related party of an
agreement with Blockbuster Video to deliver movies on demand, even
after Enron realized that no real profits would ever flow from the un-
derlying agreement. 61
That said, Pacioli would likely commend the SEC's efforts in 1975
to require large companies to disclose replacement cost data after in-
flation grew to double-digit rates in the 1970s. 62 Later, the FASB re-
quired supplemental information about the effects of changing
prices. 63 When inflation rates returned to relatively low levels, the
FASB superseded those rules and made voluntary the supplementary
disclosures about current cost and constant purchasing power
information. 64
C. Internal Controls
You may recall that Pacioli advocated various "inbuilt checks" in
his treatise on double-entry bookkeeping. These procedures would
fall within the modern term "internal controls," a concept which in-
cludes both administrative controls and accounting controls. Accountants
have historically referred to administrative controls as an enterprise's
plan of organization, procedures, and records that lead up to manage-
ment's authorization of transactions. 65 By comparison, accounting
controls describe the plans, procedures, and records which the enter-
prise uses to safeguard assets and produce reliable financial records. 66
An enterprise's internal controls should segregate the responsibilities
for authorizing and recording transactions and safeguarding assets be-
tween different individuals to detect errors and prevent fraud, thereby
61 See generally Matthew J. Barrett, Enron, Accounting and Lauyers, NOTRE DAME
LAW., Summer 2002, at 14, 16, available at http://www.nd.edu/-ndlaw/alumni/
ndlawyer/barrett.pdf.
62 Replacement Cost Data, Securities Act Release No. 5608, Exchange Act Release
No. 11,608, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,550 (proposed Sept. 3, 1975); see also Amendments to
Regulation S-X Requiring Disclosure of Certain Replacement Cost Data, Accounting
Series Release No. 190, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,596 (Mar. 31, 1976). In fact, the SEC's adop-
tion of those rules documents a rare situation in which the SEC established its own
rules for public companies. See HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 9, at 149.
63 See FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CHANGING PRICES, Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 33 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1979).
64 See FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CHANGING PRICES, Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 89 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1986).
65 HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 45, at 73.
66 Id.
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insuring greater accuracy and reliability in the accounting records
and financial statements. 67
Individually and collectively, the recent financial scandals should
help lawyers understand that Pacioli's inbuilt checks have not dimin-
ished in importance. Internal accounting controls work effectively
only when those who bear responsibility for developing, implement-
ing, and overseeing those controls stress the need to adhere to all
policies and procedures and lead by adhering to those rules them-
selves, thereby setting the right "tone at the top." Strong administra-
tive and accounting internal controls enhance the likelihood that the
enterprise will engage in sound, beneficial transactions and reduce
the chances that an enterprise will incur the enormous losses that can
result from internal control failures.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Congress has legislatively mandated that public companies adopt
and observe these crucial internal accounting controls. In the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) ,68 Congress responded to
the discovery that U.S. companies had bribed foreign officials and en-
gaged in disreputable conduct to secure business in other countries.
The legislation contained two parts: antibribery provisions and ac-
counting requirements. Presumably, Congress enacted the account-
ing rules to improve corporate accountability, on the theory that any
failure in recordkeeping or internal controls threatened the disclo-
sure requirements under the federal securities laws.69 In any event,
the FCPA imposes two distinct accounting requirements on all regis-
trants, including those that do not engage in any operations outside
67 Illustrative internal controls include cash registers that display prices and totals
to customers and allow management to total all transactions during a shift to discour-
age clerks from "pocketing" sales revenues; consecutive numbers on checks, purchase
orders, and invoices to allow better accountability; rules that require certain employ-
ees, especially in banks and other financial institutions, to take continuous, two-week
vacations each year to reduce the chance that those employees can hide any irregular-
ities; arrangements that require at least two authorized individuals to sign any check
exceeding a certain amount; the division of accounting functions so that different
individuals write checks and reconcile bank statements against the cash account; and
the separation of purchasing, receiving, and accounting functions so that the same
individual does not order, accept, and pay for goods. Id.
68 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
69 DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CoRRuPT PRACrICEs Acr 10
(2d ed. 1999).
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the United States. 70 These provisions, which Congress codified in sec-
tion 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, create federally man-
dated, minimum record keeping and internal controls standards for
all registrants. 71 Under the FCPA, therefore, bad accounting can in-
70 Note carefully that Congress did not limit the accounting requirements to situ-
ations involving foreign corruption; the two accounting provisions apply to all enter-
prises subject to the SEC's jurisdiction, including registrants that engage only in
domestic operations. First, as to the record-keeping obligations, section 13(b) (2) (A)
requires all registrants to "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b) (2) (A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004). Follow-
ing the FCPA's enactment, the SEC promulgated two rules to implement this record-
keeping requirement. Rule 13b2-1 prohibits any person from falsifying any book, re-
cord, or account which section 13(b) (2) (A) requires. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2004).
In this regard, the SEC takes the position that an enterprise's "'books and records'
include not only general ledgers and accounting entries, but also memoranda and
internal corporate reports." E.g., In re Gibson Greetings, Inc., Accounting and Audit-
ing Enforcement Release No. 730, [1995-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,245, at 63,126 (Oct. 11, 1995). Rule 13b2-2 forbids any officer or director
from, directly or indirectly, making a materially false or misleading statement or fail-
ing to state a material fact to an accountant in connection with any audit or other
filing which the Exchange Act requires. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2.
Second, all registrants must establish adequate internal accounting controls.
Based upon then-existing professional auditing standards, section 13(b) (2) (B) re-
quires registrants to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" that the enterprise: (1) executes transac-
tions in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; (2) records
transactions in such a way as to permit the enterprise (i) to prepare financial state-
ments in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other crite-
ria applicable to such statements and (ii) to maintain accountability for assets; (3)
permits access to assets only in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; and (4) compares recorded assets against actual assets at reasonable
intervals and takes appropriate action regarding any differences. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b) (2) (B). Significantly, the four clauses in section 13(b) (2) (B) came verbatim
from Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, section 320, The Auditor's Study
and Evaluation of Internal Control, which at that time discussed the objectives of inter-
nal accounting control. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Internal Controls, 61 N.C. L. REV. 505,
507 (1983) (citing CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, State-
ment on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 320.28 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants 1976)). Although subsequent SASs have clarified and updated language in
the auditing literature regarding internal control, keep in mind that SAS No. 1 sought
to provide guidance to auditors to help them evaluate internal control during an
audit. Via the FCPA, these provisions apply directly to registrants and, therefore, im-
pose a statutory obligation on management to comply with the requirements. As a
result, Congress transformed professional auditing standards into explicit statutory
requirements. Accordingly, poor internal accounting controls can also violate the
FCPA.
71 Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 to clarify certain provisions, facilitate
compliance, and enhance disclosure. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of
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deed violate the federal securities laws. 72 Because Congress incorpo-
rated the FCPA into the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC enjoys
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). For our purposes, those amendments affect the standards for record-
keeping and internal controls compliance and criminal liability in two important
ways. First, the 1988 amendments define the terms "reasonable detail" and "reasona-
ble assurances" by which registrants must keep "books, records, and accounts" and
maintain the requisite internal controls, respectively. The 1988 amendments provide
that those terms mean "such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy
prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (7). Sec-
ond, the 1988 amendments limit criminal liability to persons that "knowingly circum-
vent or knowingly fail to implement" an internal controls system or "knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account" that the enterprise keeps pursuant to the accounting
requirements. Id. § 78m(b) (4), (5); see CRUVER, supra note 69, at 33-34.
Although the 1988 amendments restrict criminal liability to intentional viola-
tions, the FCPA does not require the SEC to prove scienter to establish that either a
registrant or an individual defendant violated section 13(b) (2) in injunctive or ad-
ministrative proceedings. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749
(N.D. Ga. 1983). Indeed, the FCPA has enabled the SEC to bring administrative pro-
ceedings when inadequate systems, personnel, or equipment have caused a break-
down in an enterprise's accounting system. See, e.g., In re Sound Advice, Inc.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 696, [1995-1998 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,211, at 63,043 (Aug. 9, 1995). Several recent
cases also illustrate how the SEC can impose civil penalties against registrants that
violated the accounting requirements in FCPA. See, e.g., SEC v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1356, [1999-2001 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,863, at 63,554 (Dec. 21, 2000) (imposing a
$300,000 civil penalty for violating the books and records provisions in section
13(b) (2) (A) after senior managers overrode IBM contracting procedures and then
hid the details regarding $4.5 million improperly paid to certain Argentine officials
via a third-party subcontractor in connection with a $250 million contract to integrate
and modernize the computer system at a commercial bank that the Argentine govern-
ment owned); SEC v. Oracle Sys. Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Re-
lease No. 494, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,953, at
63,301 (Sept. 29, 1993) (entering a permanent injunction prohibiting future viola-
tions and an order imposing $100,000 in civil penalties after an inadequate internal
accounting control system caused Oracle to file materially inaccurate financial reports
with the Commission, thereby violating the minimum record-keeping standards in
section 13(b) (2) (A), and to fail to maintain accurate books and records as required
in section 13(b) (2) (B)).
72 In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the SEC staff recently reminded regis-
trants that immaterial, but intentional, misstatements can indeed violate the FCPA
record-keeping and internal controls requirements. Among other factors, the bulle-
tin urges registrants and their lawyers to contemplate the significance of the misstate-
ment, how the misstatement arose, the cost to correct the misstatement, and the
clarity of accounting guidance addressing the misstatement in assessing whether the
enterprise has kept accurate books, records, and accounts in "reasonable detail." Ma-
teriality, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,154 (Aug. 19,
1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm.
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general authority to promulgate implementing rules and regulations.
Until the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "SOx"),73
the FCPA's accounting provisions represented the most substantial
legislative foray into the accounting arena since Congress enacted the
original federal securities laws in the 1930s.
2. Missed Opportunities
Under authority granted in the FCPA, the SEC proposed rules in
1979 which would have mandated registrants to include a "Statement
of Management on Internal Control" in annual reports filed with the
Commission and sent to investors.74 Once fully implemented, the
rules would have required management to opine whether the enter-
prise's internal accounting controls provided reasonable assurance
that the enterprise would accomplish the FCPA's objectives. 75 In addi-
tion, the proposal would have required an independent accountant to
examine and report on management's statement.76 As it turned out,
the proposal provoked substantial opposition from unidentified com-
mentators, and the SEC withdrew the rules in 1980. 7 7
In 1985, a private-sector initiative again hoisted the banner for
better financial reporting. The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association, the Fi-
nancial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the
National Association of Accountants (collectively the "sponsoring or-
ganizations") formed the National Commission on Fraudulent Finan-
cial Reporting (the "Treadway Commission"), seeking to identify
causal factors that could lead to fraudulent reporting and to devise
steps to reduce its incidence. In 1987, the Treadway Commission rec-
ommended that the SEC require all registrants to include a manage-
ment report in the annual report to securityholders. 78  The
73 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
74 Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 15,772, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,702, 26,702 (proposed May 4, 1979).
75 Id. During an interim period for dates beginning after December 15, 1979,
and before December 16, 1980, the proposed rule would have required management
to disclose any "material weaknesses in internal accounting control communicated by
the independent accountants" that the registrant had not corrected and include a
statement explaining why the enterprise had not corrected those weaknesses. Id.
76 Id.
77 Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Accounting Series
Release No. 278, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,134 (June 13, 1980).
78 NAT'L COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 44 (1987) [hereinafter TREADWAY
REPORT].
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management report would acknowledge management's responsibili-
ties for the financial statements and internal control, discuss how
management fulfilled its responsibilities, and provide management's
assessment about the effectiveness of internal control.
7 9
Following the Treadway Commission's urging, the SEC again pro-
posed to adopt rules that would require registrants to include a report
of management's responsibilities in annual reports filed with the
Agency and sent to securityholders.80 This time the effort simply
lapsed into oblivion. Although the SEC never officially withdrew the
proposal, by the early 1990s the proposed rules no longer appeared
on the Agency's list of pending rulemaking activities.
81
This SEC inaction put the proverbial ball back in the private sec-
tor's court. Luckily, the Treadway Commission also recognized that
the sponsoring organizations had originally submitted various inter-
pretations and philosophies regarding internal control. The Tread-
way Commission further suggested the sponsoring organizations
"work together to integrate the various internal control concepts and
definitions" underlying this "complex, dynamic, [and] constantly
evolving" notion and "to develop a common reference point."8 2 In
1989, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) initiated a project to implement this recommen-
dation. About three years later, COSO issued a four-volume report,
entitled Internal Control-Integrated Framework ("COSO Report"), which
has quickly become the standard for defining and describing internal
control and its objectives and components, and for measuring its
effectiveness.8 3
Reacting to the COSO Report, the Public Oversight Board
(POB)8 4 of the AICPA, in its 1993 special report entitled Issues Con-
79 Id.
80 Report of Management's Responsibilities, Securities Act Release No. 6789, Ex-
change Act Release No. 25,925, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,009 (July 26, 1988).
81 Comm. on Law & Accounting, Am. Bar Ass'n, "Management" Reports on Internal
Control: A Legal Perspective, 49 Bus. LAW. 889, 899 n.51 (1994).
82 TRFADWAy REPORT, supra note 78, at 48.
83 CosM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTEmA CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992).
84 In 1977, the AICPA formed the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) as part of the
Institute's Division for CPA Firms and established the POB, a five-member, autono-
mous body, to oversee the SECPS. In that capacity, the POB monitored the quality
control programs at the public accounting firms that audited public companies.
Every three years, the SECPS required each member firm to undergo peer review. In
addition, POB studied litigation against member firms alleging audit failures involv-
ing public companies to determine whether those firms needed to take corrective
actions to strengthen their quality control systems or to address personnel deficien-
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fronting the Accounting Profession,85 recommended that the SEC require
registrants to include two reports-the first by management and the
second from the registrant's independent accountant-on the effec-
tiveness of the enterprise's internal control system relating to financial
reporting. The AICPA's Board of Directors applauded the POB's sug-
gestion. 86 Lawyers, however, expressed concern and caution. The
Committee on Law and Accounting of the American Bar Association's
Business Law Section warned against an enterprise voluntarily issuing
a report on its internal control because "such reports are 'liability doc-
uments' of uncertain but potentially broad scope. ' 87 The SEC took
no action until Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley. This chronology
does not intend to diminish the SEC's eventual adoption of its new
internal control rules under Sarbanes-Oxley. At the same time, know-
ing, as we do, about the recent internal control failures, we should not
completely overlook the Agency's historical blind spot on this issue.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley
Given that the well-publicized frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
and other companies all involved failures in internal control-a prob-
lem Pacioli warned about 440 years ago-such scandals probably
would not have surprised Pacioli. Indeed, he might even ask: "When
will they ever learn?" Pacioli might observe that each scandal illus-
trates, to lawyers and investors alike, how lax or inadequate internal
control can injure a company's reputation and market value, and ex-
pose all constituencies in a corporation to financial harm, including
enormous criminal and civil legal liability.
At least two major internal control failures occurred at Enron.
First, when Enron's board of directors approved a policy that allowed
cies. The POB also interpreted its responsibilities to include monitoring any develop-
ment that may affect public confidence in the integrity of the audit process. In 2002,
the POB voted to terminate its own existence. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 9, at
179; Pub. Oversight Bd., About the POB, at http://www.publicoversightboard.org/
about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
85 PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: ISSUES CONFRONTING THE Ac-
COUNTING PROFESSION 54 (1993).
86 Comm. on Law & Accounting, supra note 81, at 901. In late 1995, the AICPA's
Auditing Standards Board issued SAS No. 78, effective for audits involving financial
statements for periods beginning on or after January 1, 1997, which amends SAS No.
55 to incorporate the COSO Report's definition and description of internal control.
See CONSIDERATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT: AN
AMENDMENT TO STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 55, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 78 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1995).
87 William P. Hackney, A Sample Report on Internal Controls, Bus. L. TODAY,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 43, 43; see Comm. on Law & Accounting, supra note 81, at 929.
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the company to enter into transactions with certain entities owned by
Enron officers, the implementing procedures explicitly required man-
agement to use a "Deal Approval Sheet." By requiring certain disclo-
sures and the approval of Enron's chief executive officer, the Deal
Approval Sheets sought to ensure that the terms in any underlying
contracts would closely resemble the arrangements that would have
materialized in an arm's-length negotiation. In fact, the chief execu-
tive officer's signature does not appear on the sheets for several spe-
cific transactions. Moreover, the absence of sheets for other deals
suggests that Enron did not complete any such document in those
transactions. Second, Andrew Fastow, Enron's former chief financial
officer, and, for a time, the general partner of several partnerships
that entered into agreements with Enron, reportedly earned more
than thirty million dollars from his investments in those enterprises.
Even though the board seemed to recognize the conflict of interest
inherent in such related-party dealings, the board failed to require
that Mr. Fastow report his profits from the partnerships to the com-
pany. Such disclosures almost certainly would have alerted the board
to the possibility that the underlying transactions unfairly benefited
Mr. Fastow to the detriment of Enron and its shareholders.
At WorldCom, senior financial officers circumvented internal
controls and recorded adjusting journals entries that transferred vari-
ous expenses to accounts for long-lived assets. By comparison, man-
agement at Tyco signed undisclosed compensation arrangements,
abused employee relocation loan programs, issued unapproved bo-
nuses, recorded unauthorized credits to employee loans, approved
self-dealing transactions, arranged unreported perquisites, and com-
mitted other misuses of corporate trust. When Tyco's board of direc-
tors learned about these practices, it dismissed the company's general
counsel, presumably at least in part because he failed to monitor
Tyco's internal controls and report deficiencies to the board.
These scandals provoked legislative and regulatory responses that
emphasized what Pacioli viewed as absolutely essential: the need to
implement a system of "inbuilt checks." Congress reacted to the reve-
lations about lax internal controls at these and other publicly traded
companies by enacting SOx section 404, which requires that the SEC
create and enforce regulations intended to foster a more stringent
internal control environment in public companies.8 8 Speaking to an
88 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2004).
These new rules apply to large public companies beginning with fiscal years ending
after November 15, 2004. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securi-
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American Bar Association meeting of corporate lawyers, the SEC's Di-
rector of the Division of Corporation Finance asserted that these rules
mark the most important development in Sarbanes-Oxley and will
cause the biggest impact on attorneys. The Director also opined that
an effective implementation of the rules will require a greater commit-
ment of money and time than any other regulation resulting from
SOX. 89
SOx section 404(a) directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring
public companies to include a report from management on the com-
pany's internal control over financial reporting in each annual report
that (1) states management's responsibility for establishing and main-
taining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for fi-
nancial reporting and (2) contains an assessment, as of the end of the
company's most recent fiscal year, of the effectiveness of the com-
pany's internal control structure and procedures for financial report-
ing.90 Section 404(b) requires that each registered public accounting
firm that prepares or issues an audit report for a registrant to attest to,
and report on, management's assessment of internal controls over fi-
nancial reporting. 91 In making such attestations, auditors must com-
ties Act Release No. 8392, Exchange Act Release No. 49,313, 69 Fed. Reg. 9722 (Mar.
1, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/3-8392.pdf. On November 30,
2004, the SEC gave accelerated filers with (a) less than $700 million in outstanding
common equity held by non-affiliates and (b) fiscal years ending before March 1,
2005, an additional seventy-five days to comply with these new rules. See Order Under
Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting an Exemption from Speci-
fied Provisions of Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1, Exchange Act Release No.
50,754, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,291 (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
exorders/34-50754.htm. All other public companies must include a management re-
port on internal control and related auditor's report beginning for fiscal years ending
on or after July 15, 2005. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 9722.
89 HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 74.
90 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(a).
91 Id. § 7262(b). Importantly, the registered public accounting firm making the
attestation cannot do so as part of a separate engagement. Therefore, the auditor
expressing an opinion on the company's books must also prepare the attestation re-
port regarding internal controls. Some commentators estimate that compliance with
the new SEC rules will cause many public companies to face at least a one-third in-
crease in their annual audit's cost. Mandatory reporting on internal controls may also
open the door to heightened auditor liability because auditors formerly tested inter-
nal controls before the end of each reporting period, but now they must attest to their
quality as of the last date of the reporting period. Thus, auditors cannot claim that
errors in their reports result from management making changes to internal controls
after the auditor's review. HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 45, at 76.
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ply with standards that the newly created Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) will issue or adopt.9 2
Under the final rules promulgated by the SEC, management's in-
ternal control report must include (1) a statement of management's
responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal con-
trol over the company's financial reporting, (2) management's assess-
ment of that effectiveness as of the end of the company's most recent
fiscal year, (3) a statement identifying the framework that manage-
ment used to evaluate the effectiveness of this internal control, and
(4) a statement that the company's auditor has issued an attestation
report on management's assessment.93 In addition, the company
must include the auditor's attestation report in the company's annual
report. Management must also perform quarterly evaluations of
changes in internal controls that have materially affected, or are rea-
sonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over
financial reporting and report their findings. Specifically, manage-
ment may not label internal controls effective if these quarterly evalua-
tions identify one or more material weaknesses.
For purposes of implementing SOx section 404, the SEC has de-
fined "internal control over financial reporting" as a process designed
by, or under the supervision of, a company's principal executive and
principal financial officers. The company's board of directors then
implements this process to provide reasonable assurance regarding
the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with GAAP. These
controls include procedures to ensure a company maintains records
that reasonably reflect the company's transactions and dispositions of
assets, and provide assurance that the company's records of transac-
tions permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with
GAAP. Further, internal control should ensure that appropriate man-
agement and directors authorize a company's receipts and expendi-
tures and provide reasonable assurance that unauthorized acquisition,
use, or disposition of the company's assets cannot occur without
detection.
92 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b); see infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
93 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.307, .308, 229.307, .308 (2004); see also Management's Re-
port on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in
Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (providing related commen-
tary), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm.
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D. Officer Certifications
Based upon the ethical views that Pacioli espoused in his Summa,
he would likely applaud the SEC's efforts, later codified in Sarbanes-
Oxley, to personalize the conduct of business and the accuracy of the
financial accounting process by requiring officer certifications regard-
ing financial statements and internal controls.
Immediately after the original revelations that WorldCom had en-
gaged in a staggering $3.8 billion fraud, an amount which the com-
pany subsequently pegged at about eleven billion dollars, the SEC
responded. The Agency issued an order requiring the senior officers
of more than 900 of the nation's largest public companies to file
sworn statements regarding the accuracy of their company's financial
statements. 94 Congress codified similar duties in SOx section 302.
This provision directed the SEC to issue rules requiring each public
company's chief executive and financial officers to certify in every
quarterly and annual report filed with the SEC that, among other
things, based on such officer's knowledge the report does not contain
any material misrepresentations or omissions. Further, these same of-
ficers must certify that the financial statements and other financial
information included in the report fairly present, in all material re-
spects, the entity's financial condition and operation results.9 5 This
certification very much parallels an auditor's unqualified opinion, but
with one very important exception: a reference to GAAP does not
limit the executives' certification. In other words, conformity with
GAAP may not satisfy the obligation to provide full and fair disclosure
under the federal securities laws. For example, some of Enron's ag-
gressive accounting treatment may have complied with GAAP, but
nevertheless would have violated this certification requirement had it
existed before the company's collapse. The SEC promptly complied
with the statutory mandate to issue such rules within thirty days. 96
SOx section 906 adds a provision to the criminal laws containing a
separate certification requirement that creates new criminal penalties
for a knowingly false certification. 97
94 Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a) (1)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, File No. 4-460 (June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.
95 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241.
96 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Se-
curities Act Release No. 8124, Exchange Act Release No. 46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276
(Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8124.htm.
97 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 2004). The SEC has also adopted rules ad-
dressing the mechanics necessary to satisfy these provisions. Management's Report
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E. Liquidity and Cash Flows
Our Franciscan friar considered liquidity paramount for any busi-
ness. Accordingly, he would undoubtedly find satisfaction in the
MD&A requirements. As set forth in Item 303 of Regulation S-K,
those requirements instruct registrants to discuss their financial condi-
tion, including liquidity and capital resources, changes in financial
condition, and results of operations, in both the annual report sent to
shareholders and the periodic reports filed with the SEC.98 As a re-
sult, MD&A mandates disclosure of both historical and certain for-
ward-looking information, including any "currently known trends,
events, and uncertainties" that a registrant reasonably expects will
have a material impact on its liquidity, financial condition, or operat-
ing results.99 Such historical and prospective disclosures enable inves-
tors and other users to assess not only the registrant's liquidity,
financial condition, and operating results, but also its prospects for
the future. 100
These mandatory disclosures, and the SEC administrative actions
to enforce these requirements when registrants fail to disclose known
liquidity problems,101 simply highlight what Pacioli recognized long
ago: without liquidity a business fails. In recognition of the impor-
tance of cash and cash flows, however, Pacioli might well encourage
Congress and the SEC to refer specifically to the "statement of cash
flows" in various statutes and regulations requiring financial state-
ments or related disclosures. At the time that the SEC adopted Item
303 in 1980, the statement of changes in financial position, which de-
scribed the sources of the changes in an enterprise's financial condi-
tion and which was sometimes referred to as the "funds statement,"
stood as one of the required financial statements. For fiscal years end-
ing after July 15, 1988, the statement of cash flows replaced the state-
on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Ex-
change Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636.
98 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. Item 303 of Regulation S-B imposes similar obligations on
small business issuers. Id. § 228.303.
99 Id. § 229.303.
100 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Financial Reporting Release
No. 36, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428-29 (May 24, 1989), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm.
101 See, e.g., In reAm. W. Airlines, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Re-
lease No. 562, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,022, at
63,389-86 (May 12, 1994) (discussing a case where registrant failed to disclose serious
financial difficulties that made continuing operations unlikely); In re Salant Corp.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 561, [1991-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 74,021, at 63,389-78 (May 12, 1994) (same).
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ment of changes in financial position. 10 2 More than sixteen years
after that development, Congress and the SEC continue to use termi-
nology that refers to "changes in financial condition," rather than
"cash flows" or "the statement of cash flows," in various statutes and
administrative rules that involve "financial condition, changes in finan-
cial condition, and results of operations."'0 3 Presumably, the quoted
language refers to financial information contained on the balance
sheet, the statement of cash flows, and the income statement. To
stress the importance of cash and cash flows to assessing an enter-
prise's financial performance, both Congress and the SEC should
amend these statutes and administrative rules and regulations to spe-
cifically refer to the "statement of cash flows."
III. OTHER REFLECTIONS
Pacioli's possible insights about accessibility,. current value ac-
counting, internal controls, officer certifications, and liquidity have all
found expression, at least to some extent, in the SEC's regulatory
scheme. Insofar as the SEC, whether by congressional direction or
administrative action, also relies on, or has looked to, private sector
bodies to establish-or recommend-accounting principles and au-
diting standards, this Part will also evaluate the relative effectiveness of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the AICPA, the
Independence Standards Board (ISB), and the PCAOB. In addition,
we might examine the Agency's efforts to design, enforce, and im-
prove the MD&A requirements through an administrative action
against Caterpillar, Inc. Finally, this Part will discuss some issues re-
garding auditor independence, as these seem extremely relevant in
light of both Pacioli's efforts and investor confidence.
A. Private Sector
For those issuers and registrants that must file financial state-
ments with the SEC, the federal securities laws authorize the Agency
to prescribe appropriate accounting rules and auditing standards. 104
To promulgate accounting principles the SEC historically deferred,
first, to the accounting profession and, later and more successfully, to
102 See STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 95, §§ 1, 34 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1987).
103 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(j) (West
Supp. 2004) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a).
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78m(b)(1) (2000); see alsoJoel Seligman, Accounting and
the New Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943, 945 (1993) (discussing SEC author-
ity to regulate accounting and auditing).
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the broad private sector.10 5 For auditing standards, on the other
hand, until Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC largely disregarded the broad
private sector and relied exclusively on the accounting profession to
establish auditing standards. In my view, the latter self-regulatory
strategy with respect to auditing standards failed miserably, signifi-
cantly contributed to the recent corporate accounting scandals, and
resulted in the creation of the PCAOB under Sarbanes-Oxley.
1. Accounting Principles
Since its inception, the SEC has almost always preferred defer-
ence to the accounting profession and financial community over gov-
ernmental action to establish accounting principles. As early as 1938,
the SEC publicly stated its administrative policy regarding financial
statements, 0 6 intimating that it expected registrants to follow its
rules, regulations, or other official releases. 10 7 In those matters where
the SEC had not previously expressed a position and where the regis-
trant and the Commission disagreed about the proper accounting
principles, the Commission announced it would accept disclosure in
lieu of correction of the financial statements themselves only if the
registrant's treatment enjoyed substantial authoritative support. 08
Most significantly, however, the Commission indicated it would con-
sider financial statements prepared in accordance with accounting
principles that did not enjoy substantial authoritative support as mis-
leading or inaccurate, notwithstanding disclosures in the auditor's re-
port or in the notes to the financial statements.10 9 This approach
begged the question of whether any accounting principle enjoyed sub-
stantial authoritative support.
The accounting profession's first formal efforts to develop ac-
counting principles occurred in 1939, when the AICPA created the
105 Occasionally, the SEC has exercised its power to prescribe accounting methods
directly. See supra note 62.
106 Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No.
4 (Apr. 25, 1938), reprinted in 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), and in Codification
of Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,921, at 62,651
(May 7, 2003).
107 Id., reprinted in 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), and in Codification of
Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,921, at 62,651
(May 7, 2003).
108 Id., reprinted in 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), and in Codification of
Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,921, at 62,651
(May 7, 2003).
109 Id., reprinted in 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946), and in Codification of
Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,921, at 62,651
(May 7, 2003).
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Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) to determine the proper
accounting approach or approaches in particular areas of concern.' 10
The CAP published its views in the form of Accounting Research Bul-
letins (ARBs), which the Institute widely circulated. 1 Unfortunately,
the ARBs did not carry great weight in the profession. Because no
significant amount of research supported the ARBs, they simply repre-
sented a consensus of committee members and reflected the mem-
bers' experiences and viewpoints.1 12
In an effort to give more effective leadership in the determina-
tion of accounting principles, the AICPA established the Accounting
Principles Board (APB) in 1959.113 The Board's greatly expanded
ability to research questions thoroughly allowed the APB to consider
and reach some conclusions on basic concepts and accounting princi-
ples." 4 Nevertheless, the APB suffered from some of the same defi-
ciencies that marked its predecessor. This time around, however, the
process also proved a stumbling block. The compromises needed to
secure the required two-thirds vote of the members often led to re-
sults that failed to satisfy anyone and sometimes produced long delays
before the APB could reach any conclusion. A continuing disquiet
about whether the practicing members could sufficiently divorce
themselves from their major clients' interests on various issues also
plagued the APB.
Leaders in the accounting profession eventually concluded that
the system did not work and urged a total overhaul. In response, in
1971 the AICPA's Board of Directors appointed a Study on the Estab-
lishment of Accounting Principles, under the chairmanship of Francis
M. Wheat, a distinguished securities lawyer and former SEC Commis-
sioner. In 1972, pursuant to that study group's recommendations, the
110 See HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 45, at 23.
111 Id. At that time, however, these pronouncements did not bind the profession,
much less anyone else. Each ARB bore the concluding comment that "the authority
of the bulletins rests upon the general acceptability of opinions so reached." See, e.g.,
AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 45,
LONG-TERM CONSTRUCTION-TYPE CONTRACTS 1 n.1 (1955).
112 HERWITZ & BARREr, supra note 45, at 23-24.
113 Id. at 24. "The APB's membership included AICPA members, mostly in public
practice, with representatives from each of the largest accounting firms, at that time
the 'Big Eight,' a number of smaller firms and academia." Id.
114 Id. The Board also tried to resolve the more important problem areas involv-
ing accounting practices and financial reporting in an attempt "to narrow the areas of
difference and inconsistency in practice" in as expeditious a manner as practicable.
Id. By the time the AICPA dissolved the APB in 1973, the Board had issued thirty-one
"Opinions" and four "Statements," which defined and narrowed the acceptable pe-
rimeters of accounting methodology. Id.
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accounting profession created the FASB, a new body to replace the
APB as the organization responsible for determining and promulgat-
ing accounting principles. The FASB differs from the CAP and the
APB in one major respect: the FASB exists independently from the
AICPA. The sixteen trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation
(FAF) ,115 an independent charitable corporation, appoint the FASB's
seven full-time members to staggered five-year terms. 116 To assure in-
dependence, the FASB's members must terminate all other employ-
ment ties in exchange for a generous salary, which amounted to
$556,000 for the chairman and $452,000 for the six other members in
2003.117
In 1973, the SEC designated the FASB, which had just become
the most authoritative private rulemaking body for financial account-
ing pronouncements, as having substantial authority to establish ac-
115 After 2002 amendments to the FAF's trustee selection process, its eight differ-
ent sponsoring organizations, which represent various constituencies, each submit
names of at least two nominees as prospective trustees when an opening arises in a
seat assigned to that organization. If the trustees do not find the nominees accept-
able, they may consult with that particular organization and appoint another individ-
ual as long as that person's background meets the requirements for that seat. The
sponsoring organizations, their constituencies, and the number of seats assigned to
that organization appear in the following table.
Sponsoring Organization Constituency Trustees
AICPA Auditors 3
Government Finance Officers Association State and local
and the National Association of State governmental bodies
Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers and regulatory
agencies 3
American Accounting Association Accounting educators 1
Association for Investment Management
and Research Financial analysts 1
Financial Executives Institute Business executives and
financial officers 1
Institute of Management Accountants Corporate accountants 1
Securities Industry Association Investment bankers 1
Collectively, therefore, the sponsoring organizations submit nominees for eleven of
the sixteen seats on the FAF's Board. The trustees directly appoint the five remaining
"at large" seats. Press Release, Financial Accounting Foundation, Financial Account-
ing Foundation Increases Its Independence Through Amended Trustee Appointment
Process (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr072502.shtml.
116 The Board's members typically include three public accountants, two corpo-
rate executives, one financial analyst, and one academic. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra
note 9, at 154.
117 HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 25.
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counting principles. 118 With the expectation that FASB's conclusions
would promote the interests of the investing public, the SEC explicitly
expressed its intention to continue to look to the private sector for
leadership in establishing and improving accounting principles. 119 In
doing so, the Agency did not completely cede accounting rulemaking
to the private sector. The SEC, however, thereafter rarely exercised its
powers to establish accounting principles directly.120
Congress endorsed this delegation of power to promulgate ac-
counting principles for purposes of the federal securities laws in
Sarbanes-Oxley. That legislation explicitly gave the SEC discretion to
recognize any accounting principles established by a private standard-
setting body that meets certain criteria' 21 as "generally accepted" for
those purposes. In 2003, the SEC determined that the FASB and the
FAF, its parent organization, satisfied those criteria, and duly recog-
nized the FASB's financial accounting and reporting standards as gen-
erally accepted for purposes of the federal securities laws. 122 The
SEC's statement of policy that announced this designation directs the
FAF and the FASB to give the SEC timely notice of any plans to ap-
point a new member to either the FAF or the FASB;123 calls upon the
118 Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Jan.
7, 1974), reprinted in Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91 72,921, at 62,651 (May 7, 2003).
119 Id., reprinted in Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 101, 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 72,921, at 62,651 (May 7, 2003).
120 In 1978, for example, the SEC decided to reject the FASB's approach to in-
come recognition in the oil and gas industry. HERWITZ & BARRETr, supra note 9, at
149.
121 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7218 (West Supp. 2004).
122 Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of FASB as a Desig-
nated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Financial Reporting Release No. 70, 68 Fed.
Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm.
Now that the SEC has, for federal securities law purposes, designated the FASB as the
private standard-setting body that may establish GAAP, SOx section 109 now requires
registrants to pay annual fees to support both the FASB and the PCAOB. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 7219. Prior to that, the FAF and the FASB relied upon contributions and
publication sales to fund their operations. Declining contributions to the FAF, the
potential loss of revenues from the FASB's print publications, and increasing pres-
sures to offer free, electronic access to the FASB materials presented potentially seri-
ous financial problems. The new funding mechanism should help to ensure the
FASB's independence in the standard-setting process.
123 From time to time, the SEC has recommended individuals for membership on
the FASB and consulted in the appointment process. Especially during the selection
of Edmund Jenkins as the FASB's chairman in 1997, then SEC Chairman Arthur Lev-
itt provided names of potential candidates, was kept informed throughout the pro-
cess, and effectively cleared Jenkins's appointment.
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FASB to provide timely guidance to public companies, accounting
firms, regulators, and other interested parties on accounting issues
that the SEC considers significant to investors; and allows the SEC to
revise the policy statement if the Commission determines that the FAF
no longer meets the statutory criteria or the SEC's expectations. 2 4 In
that regard, the SEC stated that it would continue to monitor the
FASB's procedures, qualifications, capabilities, activities, and
results.1 25
2. Auditing Standards
As a practical matter, accounting principles are only as effective
as the auditing standards that seek to ensure their application. The
federal securities laws also effectively give the SEC the power to dictate
standards for audits involving reporting companies. Even more so
than with respect to accounting principles, the SEC had historically
deferred to the accounting profession to set auditing standards.
While the accounting profession had turned the responsibility to de-
velop and promulgate GAAP over to the FASB, the AICPA retained
the corresponding duty to establish auditing standards through its Au-
diting Standards Board (ASB), which sets the rules that the AICPA's
professional standards require members to follow in audits. By and
large, then, the accounting profession, through the ASB, essentially
self-regulated auditing. By establishing the PCAOB and giving it, sub-
ject to SEC approval, the power to set professional standards for audits
of public companies, Sarbanes-Oxley supplanted this model.
Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, most commentators believed that
Congress had given the SEC the power to establish auditing stan-
dards. 2 6 After all, the federal securities laws expressly authorized the
SEC to establish rules requiring independent accountants to audit fi-
nancial statements registrants file with the Commission. Compared to
matters involving accounting principles, however, the SEC exhibited
even greater deference to the accounting profession regarding audit-
ing standards, largely because the ASB willingly addressed issues that
the SEC deemed significant.
Modern audit procedures trace their development to a famous
scandal and failed audit involving McKesson & Robbins, Inc., a com-
124 Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of FASB as a Desig-
nated Private-Sector Standard Setter, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,333.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 104, at 945.
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pany whose shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 127
In response to the McKesson & Robbins fraud, the AICPA established
the Committee on Auditing Procedure (the "Committee") to develop
a set of auditing standards. The Committee's first Statement on Au-
diting Procedures (SAP) specifically required auditors to observe in-
ventories and to confirm receivables.
After the McKesson & Robbins fiasco, the SEC held administra-
tive hearings. In 1940, the Agency issued a report summarizing the
hearings as Accounting Series Release No. 19.128 In that release, the
SEC concluded that auditing procedures should require auditors to
observe inventories and confirm receivables. 129 Because the account-
ing profession had already taken action to adopt such procedures,1 30
the SEC refrained from establishing separate auditing procedures and
decided to let the accounting profession develop auditing standards,
thereby following the same path which the Commission had adopted
regarding accounting principles.131
After a series of audit failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Congress included a provision in the Private Securities Litigation Re-
127 Price, Waterhouse & Co. audited the financial statements for McKesson & Rob-
bins and its subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 1937. The consolidated
financial statements reported total assets exceeding eighty-seven million dollars. This
total, however, contained approximately nineteen million dollars in fictitious assets,
including about ten million dollars in feigned inventories and approximately nine
million dollars in fabricated receivables. For 1937, fictitious sales amounted to more
than eighteen million dollars on which the consolidated income statement reported
fictitious gross profit exceeding $1.8 million. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at
85.
To accomplish this fraud, Philip M. Musica, a previously convicted swindler who
served as the corporation's president under the alias Frank Donald Coster, and his
three brothers devised a clever scheme. McKesson & Robbins pretended to purchase
merchandise from fictitious vendors that supposedly retained the goods for shipment
directly to the corporation's customers. The perpetrators also prepared invoices to
document fabricated sales to customers. Musica caused McKesson & Robbins to issue
checks to the fictitious vendors, intercepted and cashed the checks, and used the
proceeds for partial payments to the corporation on the fabricated sales to customers.
Musica and his assistants, however, pocketed about $2.8 million in the scheme. Be-
cause the auditors did not observe the inventories or confirm the receivables, the
audit did not detect the fraud. Id.
128 11 Fed. Reg. 10,918 (Dec. 5, 1940), reprinted in [1937-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,020, at 62,104 (Dec. 5, 1940).
129 Id., reprinted in [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,020,
at 62,104 (Dec. 5, 1940).
130 Unfortunately, these procedures did not bind the profession. In addition, the
failure to establish definitive accounting principles during this period hindered signif-
icant improvements in auditing.
131 Accounting Series Release No. 19, 11 Fed. Reg. at 10,918.
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form Act of 1995 requiring that audits of issuers or registrants include,
among other things, procedures designed to provide reasonable assur-
ance that the audit will detect any illegal acts that would directly and
materially affect the determination of financial statement amounts. 132
In addition, the legislation specifically gave the SEC authority to mod-
ify or supplement certain generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS) in at least three areas: illegal acts, related party transactions,
and the registrant's ability to continue as a going concern. 133 In re-
sponse to this legislation, the SEC adopted an amendment to Regula-
tion S-X to define the term "[a]udit (or examination)" so that the
Commission may modify or supplement GAAS.13 4 The related finan-
cial reporting release expressed the SEC's desire to alert auditors and
issuers to the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the Commis-
sion may require additional audit procedures beyond those necessary
under GAAS. In addition, the SEC specifically rejected objections to
the amendment that argued that the legislation limited the Commis-
sion's ability to set auditing standards to the three enumerated
areas. 1
35
Even after this legislation and the SEC's broad interpretation of
its authority to establish GAAS for purposes of the federal securities
laws, up until Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC continued to show great defer-
ence to accountants. Periodically, the SEC forwarded suggestions and
hints to the accounting profession. With the SEC's approval and sup-
port in 1997, for example, the AICPA created the Independence Stan-
dards Board (ISB) to establish independence standards for auditors of
public companies, an effort labeled as a "new public-private sector
partnership." This experiment lasted until July 31, 2001, when the
ISB ceased operations. The ISB suffered from one fatal flaw: its eight
members were equally divided between the accounting profession and
so-called public members. As a result, and at least in appearance, if
not in reality, the profession could effectively block any reforms.
132 Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 301(a), 109 Stat. 737, 762-64 (adding section 10A to the
1934 Act, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004)).
133 Id.
134 Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Finan-
cial Reporting Release No. 49, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743 (Mar. 18, 1997) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (2004)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/34-38387.txt.
135 Id.; see also Shelene Clark, Securities Litigation Reform Act's Impact Questionable;
Struggle with Law's Interpretation Seen in Coming Years, CORP. COUNS. WrL., Apr. 10,
1996, at 8, 8 (outlining the legal issues that will be raised from the Private Litigation
Reform Act of 1995).
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That background brings us to Sarbanes-Oxley. Following the re-
cent high profile financial frauds that raised questions about the audit
process because auditors failed to detect seriously misstated financial
statements, Sarbanes-Oxley created the PCAOB, a specialized body to
oversee audits involving issuers and registrants.13 6 Subject to SEC ap-
proval, 137 the legislation gives the PCAOB the authority to establish
those auditing and related standards that registered public accounting
firms use to prepare and issue audit reports for public companies sub-
ject to the SEC'sjurisdiction.1 38 Despite the relevance of auditing ex-
perience to these tasks, SOx stipulates that no more than two of the
five members of the PCAOB be certified public accountants (CPAs),
with the further limitation that the Chairman of the Board not have
been a practicing CPA for at least two years prior to appointment.
Similar to the SEC's reliance on the FASB to establish GAAP for
public companies, the PCAOB's creation enables, for the first time, a
broad-based, private-sector organization to establish GAAS for audits
of public companies. While reasonable minds can disagree as to
whether the PCAOB falls into the "private-sector" category, 39 Con-
gress imposed an organizational structure that attempts to protect the
136 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2004).
137 After Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC enjoys the power to approve any rules that
PCAOB may adopt. Id. § 107(b) (2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(b)(2). For example, the SEC
recently approved a PCAOB auditing standard, effective May 14, 2004, that requires
auditors' reports on financial statements for public companies to state that the audi-
tor performed the audit in accordance with the PCAOB's standards rather than the
previously required reference to GAAS. Order Approving Proposed Auditing Stan-
dard No. 1, References in Auditors' Reports to the Standards of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, Exchange Act Release No. 49,707, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,149
(May 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/34-49707.htm.
138 The PCAOB's rules apply only to accounting firms that audit public compa-
nies. The accounting profession, through the AICPA and its ASB, still establishes
"generally accepted auditing standards in the United States," or "GAAS in the United
States" or "U.S. GAAS," for audits involving private firms. Finally, remember that the
General Accounting Office (GAO) establishes Government Auditing Standards, first
published in 1972 and commonly referred to as the "Yellow Book," that apply to au-
dits involving federal entities and other organizations that receive more than
$300,000 in federal funds annually. Whether by law or contract, these standards apply
to more than 30,000 domestic and international entities. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra
note 45, at 87.
139 See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 973 (2005) (arguing that notwithstand-
ing the PCAOB's designation as a nonprofit corporation in the private sector, various
features render the Board a public body that can engage in state action for constitu-
tional law purposes). Although technically speaking a private sector entity as a non-
profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia, the PCAOB
enjoys, subject to SEC oversight, funding from congressionally-imposed fees on issu-
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public interest by requiring a majority of non-CPAs as members. 140
With these structural features in place, the PCAOB stands poised to
protect the investing public.
B. Management's Discussion and Analysis
In this discussion of the SEC's triumphs and travails regarding
accounting and disclosure during the Agency's first seventy years, the
various accounting rules and auditing standards are necessary charac-
ters. But the protagonist role goes to the MD&A requirements, a cast-
ing Pacioli himself would likely sanction. For like his accounting
treatise, the MD&A requirements focus on a very practical considera-
tion: the fact that the thrust of accounting disclosure in general
should be to allow the investor to assess (1) not just the earnings
figures but the quality of earnings and (2) the likelihood that past oper-
ating results fairly indicate future performance. Those overarching
goals color not only the required disclosures, which must then encom-
pass textual discussion to supplement the traditional numbers in the
financial statements and the additional information in the related
notes to those statements, but should also influence management's
description of its assessment of the prospects for the future.
Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, which the SEC promulgated in
1980, stands central to the MD&A requirements. This rule requires
additional disclosures when the financial statements and accompany-
ing notes do not indicate future operating results or financial condi-
tion. 141 In particular, the rule imposes additional disclosures, most
specifically a textual discussion of any material events and uncertain-
ties that would cause future operating results to deviate from reported
financial information. 142 As the SEC neatly summarized in a 1999
consent order resolving public administrative proceedings against a
registrant, its former chairman, and several affiliates, "Item 303(a) re-
quires that management address any issues which impact the quality of
ers and statutory authority to establish GAAS for audits involving issuers and regis-
trants and to investigate registered public accounting firms.
140 While the FASB's membership does not require a majority of non-CPAs, the
Board of its parent organization, the FAF, includes five "at large" trustees, and constit-
uencies other than the AICPA can submit nominees for eight of the remaining eleven
slots on the FAF's Board. See supra note 115.
141 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2004). Item 303 of Regulation S-B imposes similar ob-
ligations on small business issuers. Id. § 228.303.
142 Id. § 229.303(a).
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earnings."143 Without descriptive information on issues such as liquid-
ity, capital resources, past operating results, and predictions of future
performance, an investor or reader cannot reasonably evaluate an ex-
isting or possible investment in the company. 144
MD&A can require additional accounting-related information in
at least two respects. First, the narrative explanation often provides
details not found in the numerical presentation or footnotes accom-
panying the financial statements.1 45 Second, the enhanced disclosure
requirements seemingly establish a lower materiality threshold than
found in financial statements under GAAP. 146 As a general rule, ac-
countants and auditors usually treat any amount which does not ex-
ceed five percent of income before taxes as immaterial. On the other
side, auditors usually consider any item which exceeds ten percent of
income before taxes as material. 147 Although neither the SEC nor the
courts have explicitly established a materiality standard for MD&A,
they have rejected mathematical standards, preferring a facts and cir-
cumstances analysis. 148 Under the federal securities laws, the Su-
preme Court has concluded that an omitted fact qualifies as material
143 In re Terex Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1126,
[1999-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,633, at 63,106 (April 20,
1999) (emphasis added).
144 Id.; see also In re Bank of Boston Corp., Initial Decision Release No. 81,
[1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,719, at 87,304 (Dec. 22,
1995) (involving the failure to disclose known trends and uncertainties in the bank's
real estate portfolio that would reasonably be expected to have a material unfavorable
impact on the bank's financial condition).
145 See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Financial Reporting Release
No. 36, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/interp/33.6835.htm.
146 See LuAnn Bean & Deborah W. Thomas, The Development of the Judicial Definition
of Materiality, 17 Accr. HISTORIANSJ. 113, 120 (1990). To the extent that the "reasona-
bly likely to have a material effect" standard in the MD&A requirements mandates
disclosure in situations that do not qualify as "material" for accounting purposes, com-
pliance with GAAP may not satisfy disclosure obligations under the federal securities
laws.
147 Id.; see also Charles Jordan et al., Materiality for Extraordinary Items, 35 NAT'L PUB.
Accr., Dec. 1990, at 42, 43 (listing other mathematical guidelines for average net
income, total revenues, total assets, and owners' equity).
148 Compare Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacat-
ing in part, reversing in part, and remanding for further consideration a district court
decision that granted the defendant's motion to dismiss after the district court held
that the alleged misrepresentations of certain fees qualified as immaterial as a matter
of law when the fees amounted to only 1.7% of the defendant company's total reve-
nues), with In re Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 C 6853, 2000 WL
1705279, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000) (granting the defendants' motion to dismiss
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when the alleged forty million dollars in undisclosed expenses constituted less than
ten percent of the company's before-tax income during the relevant period).
One relatively recent example may illustrate how a quantitatively immaterial item
might nevertheless qualify as material. An October 1998 Wall Street Journal article de-
scribes BankAmerica Corp.'s failure to disclose information about its $372 million
write down of a loan to D.E. Shaw & Co., a New York investment firm. Even though
bank officials knew about possible losses on the loan as early as August, the bank did
not disclose the extent of the losses before shareholders voted in late September to
approve a forty-three billion dollar merger with NationsBank, which created the na-
tion's second-largest bank. The article quotes the merged bank's chief financial of-
ficer as saying that "'[$372 million is] a big number but it's not material to a
company' that is as big as BankAmerica." Rick Brooks & Mitchell Pacelle, BankAmer-
ica Knew in August of Trading Woes, WALL ST.J., Oct. 16, 1998, at A3. When the merged
bank announced the write-down in mid-October, the stock price dropped eleven per-
cent in a single day. Plaintiffs quickly filed multiple class action securities fraud ac-
tions related to the merger against new BankAmerica and other defendants. See In re
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (discussing
the facts and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss);
see also Brooks & Pacelle, supra.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the SEC's staff explicitly rejected the auto-
matic classification of financial statement misstatements or omissions that fall under a
five percent threshold as immaterial, absent particularly egregious circumstances,
such as misappropriation by senior management. The staff emphasized that regis-
trants and their auditors must consider qualitative factors in materiality determina-
tions. For example, a quantitatively small misstatement or omission could
nevertheless qualify as material when it:
* arises from an item capable of precise measurement;
* masks a change in earnings or other trends;
* hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus expectations for the
enterprise;
* changes a loss into income or vice versa;
* concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant's business that has
been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations
or profitability;
* determines the registrant's compliance with regulatory requirements;
* affects the registrant's compliance with loan covenants or other contrac-
tual requirements;
* increases management's compensation-for example, by satisfying a re-
quirement for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compen-
sation; or
* involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.
In assessing multiple misstatements, the bulletin reminds registrants and auditors
that they must consider all misstatements or omissions both separately and in the
aggregate to determine whether, in relation to the individual line item amounts, sub-
totals, or totals in the financial statements, the misstatements or omissions materially
misstate the financial statements taken as a whole. Finally, the SAB reminds regis-
trants that immaterial but intentional misstatements can violate the federal securities
laws. Materiality, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,153-54
(Aug. 19, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm; see also
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if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable investor would have
considered the omitted fact important because disclosure would have
significantly altered the "total mix" of available information. 14 9 To the
extent that the "reasonably likely to have a material effect" standard in
the MD&A requirements mandates disclosure in situations which
would not qualify as "material" for accounting purposes, compliance
with GAAP may not satisfy disclosure obligations under the federal
securities laws.
In January 2002, the SEC indicated its view that the words "rea-
sonably likely" express a lower disclosure threshold than "more likely
than not."'150 Unfortunately, the SEC did not compare "reasonably
likely" to the "reasonably possible" standard that typically requires dis-
closure under GAAP. 15 1 In the years ahead, we can expect lawyers
and the courts to face this potentially important issue.15 2 At this time,
Kenneth C. Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and Protecting Materiality Standards in Finan-
cial Statements: A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 55 Bus. LAW. 1039 (2000)
(tracing the development of materiality standards, examining the purpose and rea-
soning behind SAB No. 99's release, and concluding that the bulletin creates an am-
biguous standard that opens the door to liability for innocent mistakes in judgment).
149 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (interpreting Rule 10b-5);
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (discussing the proxy
rules); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (2004) ("The term 'material,' when
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject,
limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to
buy or sell the securities registered.").
150 Commission Statement About Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finan-
cial Condition and Results of Operations, Financial Reporting Release No. 61, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3746, 3748 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8056.
htm.
151 See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 5, §§ 3, 10 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1975); see also HERWITZ &
BARRETT, supra note 45, at 181.
152 In Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992), the First Circuit-in
an opinion authored by then ChiefJudge, nowJustice, Breyer-explicitly recognized,
but did not decide, the issue. In that case, the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision dismissing a securities fraud claim because the investor did not plead
"with particularity" any specific factual allegations supporting the conclusion that
Cambex or its officers knew that the company faced a significant possibility of loss
arising from certain IBM Credit leases prior to the time that IBM Credit filed the
lawsuit. In the opinion's last paragraph, the court observed:
We need not ... decide whether the appropriate standard is knowledge (1)
that an IBM Credit lawsuit was "probable" or (2) that the lawsuit (or some
similar loss) was "reasonably likely[."] Whether the standard is one or the
other or yet some third similar standard (such as "reasonably expects"), we
should reach the same result.
Id. at 28.
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we can simply assume that the MD&A rules impose a lower standard
for disclosure, which translates to more helpful information for
investors. 153
Apart from lowering the materiality threshold, the SEC has also
sought to bolster the substance of required MD&A disclosures. In
2003, the SEC issued guidance indicating that the Agency wants to
elicit more meaningful disclosure in several areas, including (1) mate-
rial trends and uncertainties, and (2) liquidity and capital resources.
As to material trends and uncertainties, the SEC stated that the
MD&A requirements seek "to provide information about the quality
and potential variability of a company's earnings and cash flow, so that
readers can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indica-
tive of future performance."'154
If you have not already so surmised, the MD&A requirements
contain abundant, inherent wiggle room. Thus, SEC enforcement of
the requirements remains crucial to their interpretation-and ulti-
mate success. For that reason, the 1992 SEC enforcement action
against Caterpillar, Inc. represented a landmark event in the Agency's
MD&A policy.155 In that administrative action, everyone agreed that
Caterpillar's financial statements complied with GAAP, 156 which did
not require separate reporting of a foreign operation unless its reve-
nues or assets amounted to at least ten percent of consolidated reve-
nues or total assets.' 57 Everyone also agreed that as a result of "an
exceptionally profitable year" and various non-operating items, Cater-
pillar's wholly-owned Brazilian subsidiary, Caterpillar Brasil, S.A.
(CBSA), contributed some twenty-three percent of Caterpillar's con-
solidated 1989 net profits even though neither CBSA's revenues nor
assets represented ten percent or more of consolidated revenues or
total assets. Early in 1990, Caterpillar's top management realized that
the inauguration of Fernando Collor de Mello as the new President of
Brazil would bring sweeping economic and monetary changes de-
signed to bring the country's hyperinflation under control, and that
153 See, e.g., In re Caterpillar, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release
No. 363, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830, at 63,055
(Mar. 31, 1992).
154 Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Results of Operations, Financial Reporting Release No. 72, 68
Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/in-
terp/33-8350.htm.
155 See In re Caterpillar, Inc., [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 63,050.
156 See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 9, at 359, 365.
157 Id. at 365.
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those new economic policies would cause CBSA to suffer significant
losses during 1990. Nothing in Caterpillar's MD&As suggested either
the disproportionate effect of CBSA's profits to Caterpillar's overall
profitability during 1989 or management's uncertainty about CBSA's
1990 performance. That silence was exactly the kind of sin of omis-
sion that the MD&A requirements sought to prevent. By instituting
the enforcement action against Caterpillar, the SEC signaled that
GAAP would no longer shield registrants from the MD&A rules.
The SEC also quickly proved that the enforcement action against
Caterpillar would not stand as an isolated example. Subsequent to
Caterpillar, the SEC has increasingly brought enforcement actions
against registrants for inadequate disclosures regarding their financial
statements, even though those financial statements complied with
GAAP. In 1994, for example, the SEC instituted administrative pro-
ceedings against a registrant for failing to disclose a material slow-
down in sales in its periodic filings even though the corporation had
disclosed the information in a press release. 158 The SEC concluded
that a registrant must disclose known trends in the MD&A section
even though the registrant has previously announced the trends to
the public elsewhere.1 59
In 1998, Sony Corporation ("Sony") settled administrative
charges arising from the company's failure to disclose properly losses
in its Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. subsidiary ("Pictures") in the
MD&A sections of its annual reports for the fiscal year ended March
31, 1994.160 The enforcement action also involved two other current
reports that the company filed on Form 6-K, the document that for-
eign issuers use to file reports of material information with the SEC.
These inadequate disclosures occurred during the several months
before Sony wrote down about $2.7 billion in goodwill related to its
acquisition of Pictures. Despite the expressed preference of its
outside auditors and own financial officers, Sony did not report the
results of Pictures as a separate industry segment. Instead, the com-
pany reported the combined results of Pictures and Sony's profitable
music business as a single "entertainment" segment. This treatment
obscured the approximately $967 million in net losses that Pictures
had incurred-which the SEC described as a "known trend"-after
the acquisition and before the close of the fiscal year ended March 31,
158 In re Shared Med. Sys. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 33,632,56 S.E.C. Dock.
199 (Feb. 17, 1994).
159 Id.
160 See In re Sony Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1061,
[1995-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,574, at 63,816 (Aug. 5,
1998).
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1994. Additionally, Sony's filings failed to disclose that the company
had been considering the possible need to write down a substantial
part of the goodwill attributable to Pictures for more than a year. As
part of the settlement, Sony agreed to engage an independent auditor
to examine its MD&A presentation for the fiscal year ending March
31, 1999, and to adopt procedures to ensure that its new chief finan-
cial officer assumes primary responsibility for ensuring that the com-
pany's disclosures comply with legal and accounting requirements. In
a related civil action, Sony also agreed, without admitting or denying
wrongdoing, to pay a one million dollar civil penalty, an amount equal
to the largest sum the SEC has ever received for a non-antifraud
violation.
More recently, in 2002, the SEC initiated cease-and-desist pro-
ceedings against Edison Schools, Inc. ("Edison") because the com-
pany failed to disclose that a substantial portion of its reported
revenues included payments that never reached Edison. 16 1 Even
though Edison's revenue recognition practices did not violate GAAP,
the company did not disclose the amount of the expenses that certain
school districts paid directly to teachers, who remained school district
employees, or other vendors to operate the schools that Edison man-
aged. This omission distorted the realities of Edison's operations and
financial results. Edison consented to a cease-and-desist order to re-
solve the proceedings. 162
Separately and collectively, these administrative proceedings doc-
ument the importance that the SEC places on MD&A and highlight
the types of prospective information that a reader should expect to
find in future MD&As. According to the statement the SEC issued
shortly after Enron filed its bankruptcy petition in December 2001,
public companies should use their MD&As to explain in plain English
their "critical accounting policies;" the assumptions, estimates, and
other judgments or uncertainties affecting the application of those
policies; and the likelihood that the company would report different
amounts under different conditions or using different objectives.' 63
Less than six months later, the SEC issued proposed rules that would
require issuers and registrants to include a separately captioned sec-
tion regarding the application of critical accounting policies in the
161 See In re Edison Schools, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release
No. 1555, [2001-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,070, at 63,367
(May 14, 2002).
162 Id. at 63,367-72.
163 Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies,
Financial Reporting Release No. 60, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,013 (Dec. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8040.htm.
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MD&A section of various securities filings. 164 The rules would require
disclosures about both the critical accounting estimates used to apply
the company's accounting policies and the initial adoption of certain
accounting policies. 165 Although those proposed rules remain under
consideration, late in 2003 the SEC did publish additional interpretive
guidance regarding MD&A. 166 The release offered a chronology of
prior SEC actions regarding MD&A and sought to elicit more mean-
ingful disclosure about, among other things, critical accounting
estimates. 167
As mentioned in this Article's opening paragraph, the MD&A re-
quirements hold the distinction as perhaps the most significant ad-
ministrative initiative involving the intersection between accounting
and disclosure in the SEC's first seventy years. I do not expect the
prominence of the MD&A requirements to fade anytime soon. What
the SEC does, whether via rules, interpretation, or enforcement, re-
mains crucial to full disclosure and vital to the reliability and stability
of our national securities markets. I urge the SEC to continue to
164 Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about the Application of
Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Exchange Act Release
No. 45,907, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,620 (proposed May 20, 2002), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/proposed/33-8098.htm.
165 Id.
166 Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Fi-
nancial Condition and Results of Operations, Financial Reporting Release No. 72, 68
Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-
8350.htm.
167 Id. In early 2003, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance issued a report
summarizing the significant issues that its staff raised with companies in the Fortune
500 in its review of the annual reports those companies filed during 2002. The report
listed inadequate discussions in MD&A as the staf's top concern and emphasized that
review efforts would continue to focus on this section in disclosure documents. The
report encouraged all companies to present useful and meaningful disclosures about
financial condition, operating results, and liquidity. Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Summary by the Division of Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed in
the Review of the Periodic Reports of the Fortune 500 Companies, at http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last modified Feb. 27, 2003). The SEC's most
recent guidance regarding MD&A expressed the Commission's belief that less convo-
luted language and better presentation would improve the clarity and understandabil-
ity of MD&A; stressed the need for analysis (the "A" in MD&A), as well as discussion of
required information; and urged companies to focus their disclosures regarding key
indicators of financial condition and operating performance, liquidity and capital re-
sources, material events and uncertainties that would cause reported financial infor-
mation to fail to predict future operating performance or financial condition, and
critical accounting estimates. Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,056.
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stress and enforce the MD&A requirements, which I view as the
Agency's biggest accomplishment in the accounting arena.
C. Auditor Independence
To my mind, the one area involving accounting and auditing
where the SEC has sometimes neglected the need to protect the in-
vesting public involves auditor independence. Although we may
never learn exactly what caused the audit failures at Enron and other
companies in recent years, the SEC's failure to insist upon auditor
independence certainly did not help, and we can trace that failure
back at least twenty years. This section of the Article recounts in some
detail the SEC's missed opportunities and the scandals that arose, at
least in part, from the Agency's failures to act. In my opinion, how-
ever, Congress must now also shoulder some blame; the recent
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, while they definitely alleviate longstanding
ills adversely affecting auditor independence, do not go far enough to
remedy the problem completely. Independence remains the corner-
stone for the auditing process and the auditing profession. The SEC
should further solidify that essential independence.
Before describing how the SEC has failed to preserve inviolable
auditor independence and my views as to better enhance it in the fu-
ture, as a preliminary matter, I should distinguish the roles and re-
sponsibilities of auditors and attorneys. Basically, lawyers act as
advocates for their clients, while auditors serve as independent attes-
tators. In essence, an auditor must treat the financial markets, rather
than the enterprise undergoing the audit or its management, as the
real client. In the words of Professor Calvin H. Johnson, "[auditors]
owe no duty to the firm: In the game of auditing, the accountants are
the cops and managers are the robbers.' 6
8
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,1 69 the Supreme Court con-
trasted the roles of attorneys and independent auditors in holding
that an auditor must disclose audit workpapers in response to a sub-
poena issued by the Internal Revenue Service. As lawyers generally
appreciate, they serve as confidential advisors and advocates for cli-
ents. The lawyer's duty of loyalty requires a lawyer to present the cli-
ent's case in the most favorable possible light. By comparison, an
auditor assumes a different role which the Supreme Court described
168 Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting in Favor ofInvestors, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 637, 638
(1997).
169 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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as "a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations."170 The
Supreme Court wrote:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corpo-
ration's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public watch-
dog" function demands that the accountant maintain total indepen-
dence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to
the public trust.17 1
The SEC, fortunately, has endorsed the Supreme Court's view of
the accounting profession's role as the auditor. In that regard, the
Agency requires an independent auditor's report to accompany all fi-
nancial statements that issuers and registrants file. 172 But what stan-
dards determine independence? As starters, SEC rules and
professional standards prohibit auditing firms, their owners, and audit
employees from owning any direct financial interest or material indi-
rect financial interest in an audit client, its parent, any subsidiaries, or
other affiliates, or from holding a close connection with the issuer or
registrant as a director, officer, or employee. 173
170 Id. at 817.
171 Id. at 817-18; see also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 765 So.
2d 36, 38-39 (Fla. 2000) (using the reasoning in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. to
conclude that certain public policy reasons that prevent an insurer or assignee from
asserting a professional malpractice claim against an attorney do not apply to such
claims against an independent auditor). But see Daniel R. Fischel, Lauyers and Confi-
dentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19-21, 33 (1998) (disagreeing with the Supreme
Court's distinction between the roles of attorneys and independent auditors; arguing
that, as reputational intermediaries, lawyers and auditors perform far more similar
economic functions than the Court's analysis suggests; and ultimately concluding that
"[a]bsent some more compelling justification for [attorney confidentiality rules, such
as the ethical duty of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the work prod-
uct doctrine,] than has been advanced to date, these doctrines should be abolished").
172 For enterprises subject to the SEC's jurisdiction, the Commission requires the
auditor's report to state (1) whether the accountant performed the audit in accor-
dance with GAAS and (2) the auditor's opinion regarding the accompanying finan-
cial statements and the accounting principles and practices that the registrant used to
prepare those financial statements. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 45, at 58.
173 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b)-(c) (2004); see also In re Rider, Accounting and Audit-
ing Enforcement Release No. 555, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,015, at 63,389-55 (Apr. 29, 1994) (permanently denying an auditor who
owned 2000 shares of common stock in an audit client the privilege of appearing or
practicing before the SEC as an accountant).
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The SEC's rules on independence also require intellectual hon-
esty in both fact and appearance. The Agency will not recognize an
auditor as independent if "a reasonable investor with knowledge of all
relevant facts and circumstances" would conclude that the auditor
cannot exercise objective and impartial judgment on all issues encom-
passed within the engagement involving the particular audit client.
To determine whether an auditor qualifies as independent, the SEC
will consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing
on all relationships between an accountant and any audit client or
affiliate. 174 In that regard, the SEC will look to whether the relation-
ship between the auditor and the audit client or the provision of any
nonaudit service (1) creates a mutual or conflicting interest between
the auditor and the audit client, (2) places the auditor in the position
of auditing the auditor's own work, (3) results in the auditor acting as
management or as an employee of the audit client, or (4) makes the
auditor an advocate for the audit client.175
While those principles flow from the SEC's Codification of Finan-
cial Reporting Policies,' 76 the Agency has not always enforced those
standards stringently. During the late 1990s, the largest public ac-
counting firms-first the Big Six and then the Big Five (now the Final
Four)-increasingly provided nonaudit services, such as consulting,
internal auditing, and tax advising, often to the very enterprises they
audited. From 1988 to 1999, the percentage of average revenue at the
then-Big Five accounting firms arising from accounting and auditing
services fell from fifty-five to thirty-one percent. By comparison, dur-
ing that same period the percentage of average revenue coming from
management consulting services increased from twenty-two to fifty
percent. On average, public accounting firms charged $2.69 in non-
audit fees for every dollar in audit fees. 177 In essence, auditing be-
came a "loss leader" to more profitable consulting services.'
78
174 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b).
175 Id. § 210.2-01(1)-(2).
176 Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities
Act Release No. 7870, Exchange Act Release No. 42,994, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, 43,158
(proposed July 12, 2000) (articulating four governing principles found in the Codifi-
cation, see supra note 50 and accompanying text), available at http://www.sec.gov/
.rules/proposed/34-42994.htm; see also Revision of the Commission's Auditor Inde-
pendence Requirements, Financial Reporting Release No. 56, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008,
76,030 (Dec. 5, 2000) (explaining the rationale underlying the preliminary note that
explains the SEC's approach to independence issues), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm.
177 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 15 (2002).
178 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1410-12 (2002) (discussing how the major accounting
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As only one illustration, Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen,
lacked independence in both fact and appearance. During 2000, the
year before Enron's bankruptcy, the company paid fifty-two million
dollars to Andersen-twenty-five million dollars for auditing services
and an additional twenty-seven million dollars for nonauditing ser-
vices-and ranked as Andersen's second largest client. Perhaps more
significantly, an internal Andersen memo from February 2001 discuss-
ing the retention of Enron as an audit client refers to one hundred
million dollars a year in potential revenues from Enron. Even if An-
dersen could absorb the loss of Enron as a client, individual careers
and the Houston office depended upon retaining the Enron engage-
ment. As the audit partner for the firm's second largest client, David
B. Duncan enjoyed clout not only in the Houston office, but through-
out Andersen. Indeed, one commentator has accurately described a
fifty million-dollar client as a "meal ticket" for a forty-two year-old au-
dit partner.1 79
To exacerbate the problem, the Big Five typically encouraged
their employees, especially those not likely to become partners, to
take jobs with clients or potential clients when they left the firm. The
resulting "revolving door" between Andersen and Enron only weak-
ened the auditor's appearance of independence. Between 1989 and
2001, eighty-six people left Andersen to work for Enron. Andersen
alumni at Enron included Richard A. Causey, its chief accounting of-
ficer and a former Andersen audit manager; Jeff McMahon, Enron's
treasurer; and Sherron Smith Watkins, the vice president who unsuc-
cessfully tried to blow the whistle on Enron's aggressive accounting.
Employees at Enron often referred to Andersen as "Enron Prep." In
the "up or out" environment at Andersen, everyone who worked on
the Enron account had subtle incentives to keep both their bosses and
the people at Enron happy.
Finally, the so-called "integrated audit" Andersen employed at
Enron and then sought to market more widely to other clients im-
paired the firm's independence. Under this model, Andersen at-
tempted to combine its role as external auditor with the process of
internal auditing, whereby an enterprise checks its own books. Paral-
leling and sometimes overlapping outside or independent audits, in-
ternal audits seek to ensure that an enterprise follows its procedures,.
safeguards its assets, and operates efficiently. Under a five-year, eigh-
firms used auditing services to attract clients, to whom they then sold more lucrative
consulting services).
179 See Kip Dellinger, Critique of Tax Bar Clarified, 99 TAx NoTEs 155, 155 n.2
(2003).
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teen million dollar contract that looked to create an "integrated au-
dit," Andersen took over Enron's internal auditing in 1994,
transforming dozens of Enron staffers into Andersen employees. The
Wall Street Journal reported that before Enron's collapse more than
one hundred Andersen employees worked in leased space inside En-
ron's headquarters in Houston. In videotapes Andersen filmed to
market the "integrated audit," people at both Andersen and Enron
described how intertwined their operations had become. In one seg-
ment, Jeffrey Skilling, then Enron's president, commented: "I think
over time we and Arthur Andersen will probably mesh our systems
and processes even more so that they are more seamless between the
two organizations."18 0
1. Another Missed Opportunity
While Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementing rules do strengthen
auditor independence, these reforms were late arriving. The SEC ini-
tially had the opportunity to strengthen auditor independence in the
late 1970s when the success of the consulting practices in public ac-
counting firms under the rubric of "management advisory services,"
or MAS, attracted the Agency's attention. Accordingly, the SEC issued
two administrative releases, Accounting Series Release Nos. 250 and
264, to address the heightened concern that providing such services
to audit clients could, or could appear to, impair the auditor's
independence.
In Accounting Series Release No. 250,181 effective for proxy state-
ments filed after September 30, 1978, the SEC required registrants to
(1) describe each service the independent accountant provided to the
registrant during the most recent fiscal year, (2) disclose the percent-
age relationships that (a) the fees for individual nonaudit services
bear to the audit fee if that percentage exceeds three percent and (b)
the fees for the aggregate nonaudit services bear to the audit fee, and
(3) state whether the registrant's audit or similar committee or its
board of directors approved in advance each service that the indepen-
dent auditor provided and considered the possible effect of the per-
formance of each such service on the auditor's independence. 8 2
180 See lanthe Jeanne Dugan et al., On Camera, People at Andersen, Enron Tell How
Close They Were, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at Al.
181 Disclosure of Relationship with Independent Public Accountant, Accounting
Series Release No. 250, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,110 (July 6, 1978).
182 Id.
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About a year later, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No.
264,183 which stated the Commission's views regarding various factors
auditors should consider in assessing whether performing nonaudit
services for publicly traded audit clients impairs independence.1 8 4 In
addition, the release set forth certain factors that audit committees,
boards of directors, and managements should consider in determin-
ing whether to retain their independent auditors to perform nonaudit
services. 18 5
Ironically, in response to those developments and similar regula-
tory initiatives in other parts of the world, Harvey Kapnick, then Ar-
thur Andersen's chief executive, proposed to spin-off the firm's
consulting practice from the audit and tax practices in an effort to
deal with the issue. When the firm's partners rejected that proposal in
favor of an alternative that would drastically reduce the size of the
consulting practice and consulting work performed for SEC audit cli-
ents, Kapnick resigned as the firm's chief executive and left Arthur
Andersen.
After the 1980 election, the SEC moved into a deregulatory
phase.18 6 In 1981, the SEC proposed to withdraw the rule that re-
quired disclosures about nonaudit services in proxy statements. 187
183 Interpretative Release Relating to Accounting Matters; Scope of Services by In-
dependent Accountants, Accounting Series Release No. 264, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,156
(June 20, 1979).
184 In particular, the auditor should consider its dependence on revenues from
MAS, both from the standpoint of MAS revenues to total firm revenues and the rela-
tionship between the audit fee and the proposed MAS fee. In addition, auditors must
exercise care to (1) serve only in an advisory capacity and ensure that they do not
supplant management, (2) avoid engagements that will require self-review, (3) con-
sider whether the nonaudit services may actually enhance audit quality, and (4) iden-
tify the relationship of the engagement to audit skills to prevent the auditing firm
from essentially becoming a MAS business. Id. at 36,157-59.
185 In the first instance, the SEC encouraged audit committees, boards of direc-
tors, and management to weigh the economic benefits that the engagement would
offer against the potential adverse effects of having the auditor perform nonaudit
services in an effort to assess whether the engagement offers real advantage to the
client. Like the auditor, the audit committee, the board, and management should
consider whether the nonaudit services would supplant management or create self-
review, and assess whether the engagement unwisely increases the auditor's depen-
dence on MAS. Id. at 36,159-60.
186 Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today (pt. 1),
17 AccT. HORIZONS 189, 204 (2003).
187 Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting
Series Release No. 296, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,181 (Aug. 27, 1981). The proposing release
stated that "[a]lthough specific information about nonaudit services is important, it
may not be of sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation of the disclosure
requirement." Id. at 43,181. In addition, the SEC expressed its belief that the ac-
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Concurrently, the SEC rescinded ASR No. 264,188 opining that the
Commission "has achieved its objective in issuing ASR 264."189 In es-
sence, the SEC embraced an approach that allowed the accounting
profession to regulate itself, stating:
Accountants and their self-regulatory structure, audit committees,
boards of directors, and management are aware of the Commis-
sion's views on accountant's independence and should be sensitive
to the possible impact on independence of nonaudit services per-
formed by accountants. The Commission believes it should be able
to rely on these persons to ensure adequate consideration of the
impact on accountants' independence of nonaudit services because
they share the responsibility to assure that the public maintains con-
fidence in the independence of accountants. 190
Less than six months later, the SEC issued a final rule that re-
scinded ASR No. 250, eliminating the rule requiring disclosure in
proxy statements about the nonaudit services that the independent
auditor provided for the registrant. 19 1
Although the SEC eventually strengthened its auditor indepen-
dence rules in 2000 after a bitter dispute with the accounting profes-
sion, the damage had already been done. 1 92
2. Sarbanes-Oxley and Its Failure to Ensure Auditor Independence
Among its most critical provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to
strengthen auditor independence. Unfortunately, the reforms in
Sarbanes-Oxley, by focusing exclusively on independence issues aris-
ing from conflicts of interests, overlook the probability that uncon-
scious bias, and more specifically an auditor's propensity to interpret
data in accordance with her desires, typically causes audit failures. As
long as financial or other incentives tempt auditing firms and their
counting profession's self-regulatory mechanism could "generate appropriate infor-
mation about nonaudit services to enable adequate continued oversight." Id.
188 Rescission of Certain Accounting Series Releases and Adoption of Amend-
ments to Certain Rule of Regulation S-X Relating to Disclosure of Maturities of Long-
Term Obligations, Accounting Series Release No. 297, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,411 (Aug. 28,
1981).
189 Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, 46 Fed. Reg.
at 43,185.
190 Id.
191 Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting
Series Release No. 304, 47 Fed. Reg. 5404 (Feb. 5, 1982).
192 See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Finan-
cial Reporting Release No. 56, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (c) (4) (2001)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7919.
htm.
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executives and employees to try to retain an audit engagement, un-
conscious bias will plague auditing. Accordingly, unconscious bias
suggests the need to require mandatory rotation of audit firms after
fixed terms for present fees. Such a reform would eliminate the
threat that a public company could fire or otherwise punish its auditor
for failing to approve questionable accounting practices. 19 3
In an effort to reduce conflicts of interest, Sarbanes-Oxley con-
tains at least six different provisions designed to strengthen various
requirements regarding auditor independence for public compa-
nies. 194 These provisions address audit committees, prohibited ser-
vices, pre-approval requirements, audit partner rotation, conflicts of
interest, and implementing regulations. 19 5
Most relevant to this discussion, SOx section 201 prohibits audi-
tors from providing certain services to audit clients subject to the
SEC's jurisdiction. 196 In essence, the legislation codifies a list con-
tained in the regulations on auditor independence that the SEC
adopted in 2000.197 The "prohibited activities" for auditors include
bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client's accounting
records or financial statements; financial information systems design
and implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions,
or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit out-
sourcing; management functions; human resources; broker-dealer, in-
vestment adviser or investment banking services; legal services; expert
services unrelated to the audit; and, subject to the SEC's approval, any
other service that the PCAOB decides to prohibit via regulation. 198 If
193 MatthewJ. Barrett, Enron and Andersen-What Went Wrong and Why Similar Audit
Failures Could Happen Again, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
155, 166-67 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
194 See MatthewJ. Barrett, "Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence
Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 463, 470-73.
195 Id. In addition, the Act directed the Comptroller General to study the poten-
tial effects arising from requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 207, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7232 (West Supp. 2004). In late 2003, the General
Accounting Office subsequently submitted a report concluding that costs from in-
creased audit fees and the loss of institutional knowledge acquired by a public com-
pany's previous auditor under mandatory audit firm rotation likely outweighed any
benefits from enhanced auditor independence. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-
04-216, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION 3, 4, 8 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04216.pdf.
196 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-1, 7231.
197 See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,008.
198 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-1 (g), 7231. Pursuant to a directive in SOx section 208(a), in
early 2003 the SEC issued final regulations designed to strengthen auditor indepen-
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a registered public accounting firm provides any of the listed services
to an audit client who is also an issuer or registrant, the audit firm
likely would not only jeopardize its independence from the audit cli-
ent, but also violate federal securities laws, SEC regulations, and
PCAOB rules. As described more fully in the next paragraph, an audi-
tor may perform services not included on the prohibited list, such as
tax services, for an audit client only if the client's audit committee
approves those services in advance.
In that regard, Sarbanes-Oxley generally requires an issuer's audit
committee to pre-approve all services, both audit and nonaudit, that a
registered public accounting firm provides to an audit client.199 This
requirement specifically applies to any non-prohibited services. In ad-
dition to satisfying the pre-approval requirement, issuers must disclose
the amounts paid to auditors for various types of services.
200
To enable investors to evaluate the auditor's independence, the
final rules expanded previously required disclosures regarding fees
paid to the auditor for both audit and nonaudit services. These dis-
closures must cover the last two fiscal years and four distinct catego-
ries: "Audit Fees," "Audit-Related Fees," "Tax Fees," and "All Other
Fees." In the future, such disclosures will appear in both a public
company's annual report and proxy statement.
20 1
dence. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Indepen-
dence, Financial Reporting Release No. 68, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8183.htm. These regulations, which generally became effective on May 6, 2003,
amended the Code of Federal Regulations to reflect SOx's new rules on prohibited
services. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (2004).
199 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-1, 7231. SOx section 202 allows the audit committee to dele-
gate the authority to grant pre-approvals to one or more designated members, as long
as any designee also qualifies as an independent director and any resulting approvals
come before the full audit committee at each of its scheduled meetings. In addition,
the statute allows a de minimis exception to the pre-approval requirement when an
auditor provides services which the issuer did not recognize at the time of the engage-
ment as nonaudit services, and the aggregate amount of all such nonaudit services
that the auditor provided to the issuer did not exceed five percent of the total amount
that the issuer paid to its auditor during the fiscal year in which the auditor provided
the nonaudit services. After either the issuer or the auditor promptly brings such
services to the audit committee's attention, the audit committee can approve these
services before the auditor completes the audit. Once again, if the audit committee
delegates such approval authority to one or more of its members, those members may
grant the approval necessary for the de minimis exception. Id.
200 Id. § 78j-1 (i).
201 Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Indepen-
dence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6006, 6030, 6048 (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.,
including 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (Item 9(e)(1))).
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So far, so good. But did Congress cover all the bases? A recent
Harvard Business Review article entitled Why Good Accountants Do Bad
Audits argues that unconsciously biased judgments, or what lawyers
often refer to as cognitive bias, rather than criminal collusion between
auditors and management, often cause audit failures. 20 2 Two recent
experiments, one with business students and the other with profes-
sional auditors, demonstrated that even the suggestion of a hypotheti-
cal relationship with a client distorts an auditor's judgments. As the
audit failure at Enron vividly illustrates, long-standing relationships in-
volving millions of dollars in ongoing revenues can only magnify these
results. The article posits that three structural aspects of the account-
ing industry-ambiguity, attachment, and approval-create signifi-
cant opportunities for bias to influence auditing judgments. In
addition, the article highlights three aspects of human nature-famili-
arity, discounting, and escalation-that amplify auditors' unconscious
biases. 20 3 If unconscious bias explains most audit failures, the auditor
independence provisions in SOx largely miss the mark. As long as
financial or other incentives tempt auditing firms and their executives
and employees to try to retain an audit engagement, unconscious bias
will remain present.20 4 Thus, unconscious bias suggests the need for
the SEC to require mandatory rotation of audit firms after fixed terms
for preset fees. The preset fees and fixed terms would eliminate the
threat that a public company could fire or otherwise punish its auditor
for failing to approve questionable accounting practices.
Another related congressional blunder on this issue involves tax
services that auditors might perform for audit clients. During the
hearings which ultimately led to Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress considered
a ban that would have prevented auditing firms from providing any
nonaudit services, including so-called "tax services," to publicly traded
audit clients. These tax services range from tax compliance work,
such as preparing tax returns, to sophisticated tax minimization strate-
gies, or "tax shelters," that aggressively seek to use quirks in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code to avoid taxes. Ultimately, Congress decided
against an absolute bar on nonaudit services and instead developed a
list of prohibited services. Unfortunately, Congress omitted tax ser-
vices from that list, although Congress did give the PCAOB the power
to add to the list, subject to SEC approval. Sadly, when the SEC issued
its final rules on auditor independence to implement the reforms in
202 Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, I-IARv. Bus. REv.,
Nov. 2002, at 96.
203 See id. at 102.
204 Barrett, supra note 193, at 166.
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Sarbanes-Oxley, the accompanying administrative release specifically
reiterated the Agency's "long-standing position that an accounting
firm can provide tax services to its audit clients without impairing the
firm's independence." 20 5 Various commentators, including myself,
continue to argue that various conflicts of interest arise anytime an
auditor offers significant tax advice to an audit client or promotes a
tax shelter to anyone. 20 6 As the studies underlying the Harvard Busi-
ness Review article demonstrate, financial and other incentives can po-
tentially influence an auditor's decision to acquiesce in a questionable
accounting practice. Under one Sarbanes-Oxley reform, the national
securities exchanges and national securities associations have adopted
rules that require listed companies to give their audit committees di-
rect responsibility to hire, compensate, oversee, and fire the indepen-
dent auditor.20 7 While management can no longer hire or fire the
auditor, under the guise of increasing auditor independence, man-
agement can use "enhanced independence" to support a recommen-
dation to the audit committee to hire another firm to provide tax
services, other permissible nonaudit services, or future audit services.
Thus, if the auditor does not approve, or at least acquiesce in, certain
accounting treatments or disclosures that management prefers, the
auditor conceivably jeopardizes potentially significant future profes-
sional fees.
CONCLUSION
As I have personally reflected through Pacioli's eyes on the SEC's
record on accounting and auditing issues during the past seventy
years, I would list as especially high points the Commission's reliance
on the private sector to set accounting principles; the numerous ac-
counting authorities that the Commission and its staff have promul-
gated; the Agency's efforts to design, improve, and enforce the MD&A
requirements; the focus on internal controls; and its leadership on
accounting issues. In addition to often inadequate resources, which I
really cannot blame on the SEC, the two glaring weaknesses are the
belated and still incomplete efforts to safeguard auditor indepen-
205 Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Indepen-
dence, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6017.
206 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 194, at 466-67 (arguing that auditors for public
companies should also not provide tax compliance services to audit clients or their
executives); Bernard Wolfman, SEC Let Investors Down, 98 TAx NOTES 1019 (2003)
(opining that the SEC "has left the investing public in the lurch" and urging the SEC
and Congress to prohibit auditors for public companies from promoting tax shelters
or providing tax planning and consulting services).
207 HERWITZ & BARRErr, supra note 45, at 52-53.
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dence and the failure to complete the initiative that would have re-
quired management to report annually on the effectiveness of the
company's internal controls at least two decades before Sarbanes-
Oxley.
This Article has looked at the distant past, where we saw one man
struggling on his own to explain the mechanics of bookkeeping-and
the responsibilities of those who practice it. We have examined the
more recent past, where events have forced regulators, legislators, and
the accounting profession to reflect on their responsibilities to the
investing public and to fashion some inbuilt checks that will safeguard
the public's trust. Pausing now to look ahead, I view one issue as abso-
lutely essential to retaining the U.S. securities markets' leading place
in the world: a still further enhanced commitment to auditor
independence.
Finally, in an effort to give a final salute to our dear friar, I revise
my earlier mnemonic list to highlight the SEC's accomplishments and
challenges as follows:
P Private sector
A Accessibility
C Caterpillar
I Internal controls
0 Officer certification
L Liquidity
I Independence
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